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Keeping Disaster Human: Empathy,
Systematization, and the Law
Ryan S. Keller*
ABSTRACT
In response to recent disasters, legal scholars and policy-
makers have condemned the lack of a universal and systematic
characterization of disaster and response. They contend that
more formally standardizing disaster definitions and protocols
will improve efficiency, clarity, and coordination. Despite some
truth to these claims, they fail to consider that increased
systematization may result in unintended, deleterious
consequences. In particular, it may subvert or distort the
empathic decision-making and prosocial motivation essential to
effective disaster management. Innovative research in
psychology and neuroscience indicates that empathy and
prosocial motivation are not automatic responses to the plight of
others, but are fragile and easily weakened. Who conceptualizes
harm, risk, and disaster, with which tools, and for what
purposeall substantially influence whether affective reactions
effectively translate into prosocial behavior. The systematization
of disaster, victims, and harm via statistics, quanta, and
impersonal procedures may thus compromise the vital human
dimensions of disaster response. It can also impair elite
decision-making, weaken political will, and decrease donations.
As such, failure to take into consideration the broader
implications of systematizing reforms risks inadvertently
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undermining meaningful improvements in disaster risk
management.
One can, in principle, master all things by calculation.
Max Weber1
Statistics are human beings with the tears dried off.
 Paul Slovic2
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1. MAX WEBER, Science as a Vocation (1919), in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129, 139 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1946).
2. Various authors, including Paul Slovic, have employed this aphorism:
how can we put the tears back and thus impart the feelings that are needed
for rational action? Scott Slovic & Paul Slovic, Numbers and Nerves: Toward
an Affective Apprehension of Environmental Risk, 13 WHOLE TERRAIN, no. 1,
20042005, at 13, 16; see also PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT:
THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 355 (1985) (As someone once said,
however, statistics are human beings with the tears wiped off.).
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VI. Conclusion............................................................................. 69
INTRODUCTION
Hurricanes wreak havoc, wildfires engender panic, and
earthquakes bring destruction. In the face of disaster, the
ultimate goal is an effective response. However, said response
depends on more than legal codes, written procedures, and
logistical capability. It depends on equally important yet often
overlooked facets such as affective response, empathic feeling,
and motivation to help others. Rules, statutes, and policies do
not assess harm, seek consensus, or rescue those in need.
Human beings do. Indeed, disasters are physical as well as
social events that involve subjective interpretations of risk and
vulnerability.3 Disasters reveal ongoing societal and economic
complexitiessuch as the exploitation of natural resources or
the alteration of atmospheric or migratory conditions.4 They
expose priorities associated with unsustainable practices such
as construction in coastal regions or increases in CO2 emission
levels.5 Disaster risks may arise from seemingly arbitrary
incidents that are, in fact, the consequences of specific
administrative policies or patterns of behavior.6 Disasters also
differentially impact distinct groups within a population.7 As
3. The present treatment does not rigidly separate human-caused from
putatively physical disasters. It is generally assumed here that disasters of
physical conditions, technology, global warming, and related occurrences can
be meaningfully addressed together for purposes of the discussion, as
sufficient overlap between the different types of disaster likely mitigates the
need to exclude a particular type.
4. See generally ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW
MODERNITY 984 (Mark Ritter trans., 1992) (1986) (outlining various facets of
the social production of risk and environmental hazards); THE RISK SOCIETY
AND BEYOND: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR SOCIAL THEORY (Barbara Adam et al. eds.,
2000) (providing critical perspectives on new technologies and practices by
analyzing complex social and economic relationships built upon specific
conceptions of risk).
5. See THE H. JOHN HEINZ III CENTER FOR SCIENCE, ECONOMICS AND
THE ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN LINKS TO COASTAL DISASTERS 2956, 8487
(2002) [hereinafter HUMAN LINKS TO COASTAL DISASTERS].
6. See Michele L. Landis, Let Me Next Time Be Tried By Fire: Disaster
Relief and the Origins of the American Welfare State 17891874, 92 NW. U. L.
REV. 967, 97073 (1998).
7. See Alice Fothergill, Gender, Risk, and Disaster, 14 INTL J. MASS
EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 33, 4849 (1996); Laura Pulido, Rethinking
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the events of September 11th and Hurricane Katrina attest,
disasters permeate identity and collective memory.8 They test
and thus reveal weaknesses in material infrastructure as well
as political commitment.9
The human complexities of disaster make investigating
and responding to its threats formidable.10 Yet, a wide-ranging,
interdisciplinary body of disaster-related research is growing,11
with some scholars likening its development to that of
environmental law and research in the 1960s and 1970s.12
Within this body of research, there are increasing calls for a
more universal, systematic approach to disaster.13 Specifically,
numerous researchers, policy-makers, and academics advocate
developing a more analytically rigorous basis for modeling and
evaluating disasters,14 with greater mathematical and
quantitative rigor.15 Others have followed suit, condemning
inadequate responses to Hurricane Katrina and other
calamities as evidence that the law is woefully unprepared to
handle disasters.16
Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban Development in Southern
California, 90 ANNALS ASSN AM. GEOGRAPHERS 12 (2000).
8. See Jim Chen, Law Among the Ruins, in LAW AND RECOVERY FROM
DISASTER: HURRICANE KATRINA 1, 1 (Robin Paul Malloy ed., 2009); Helen H.
Fung & Laura L. Carstensen, Goals Change When Lifes Fragility is Primed:
Lessons Learned from Older Adults, the September 11th Attacks and SARS, 24
SOC. COGNITION 248, 25354 (2006).
9. See HUMAN LINKS TO COASTAL DISASTERS, supra note 5, at 7891.
10. See, e.g., id. at 2956, 8487.
11. See Chen, supra note 8, at 23; ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FACING
CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINAWORLD 56, 254
(2010).
12. Daniel Farber, Symposium Introduction: Navigating the Intersection
of Environmental Law and Disaster Law, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1783, 178687,
181520 (2011).
13. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 14,
93 (2004) (decrying the limited systematic analysis of catastrophic risks, and
advocating increased use of cost-benefit analysis of responses to the risks);
RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 185, 191, 19596 (2008); Farber,
supra note 12, at 1786; E.L. (Henry) Quarantelli, A Social Science Research
Agenda for the Disasters of the 21st Century, in WHAT IS A DISASTER? NEW
ANSWERS TO OLD QUESTIONS 325, 329, 338, 34146 (Ronald W. Perry & E.L.
Quarantelli eds., 2005).
14. Jim Chen, Modern Disaster Theory: Evaluating Disaster Law as a
Portfolio of Legal Rules, 25 EMORY INTL L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2011).
15. Id. at 1121, 1143; POSNER, supra note 13.
16. Farber, supra note 12, at 1786; accord Chen, supra note 8.
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Although many of the advocated reforms would likely bring
key improvements to disaster risk management, failure to
adequately consider potential adverse effects would be
shortsighted. Because disasters are not just physical events
isolated in moments of time, the ways governments and
citizens conceptualize and frame disasters inevitably influence
those groups responses to disasters.17 Far from constituting an
exercise in merely responding to objective facts, defining and
mitigating disaster are social, political, and ethical
negotiations.18 Indeed, [a]lthough the category disaster at
first may seem unproblematic . . . we should see its definition
and boundaries as precisely what is at stake in many contests
over the allocation of federal resources.19 Systematizing the
benchmarks, standards, and significance of disaster not only
influences risk management, it distributes cultural and
material resources, institutes conceptions of justice or equality,
and alters existing social landscapes.20
This article provides overdue scrutiny of calls for enhanced
systematization, and proceeds as follows: Section I outlines key
ways in which international, federal, and state authorities
characterize disaster. It explains that both legal and theoretical
frameworks involve basic definitions as well as shared
protocols, quantified formulas, and statistics. Amidst variation,
reformers advocate greater systematization of disaster and
response given the potential benefits. However, Section II
describes the broader contours of reform, and delineates the
ways in which systematization fails to provide a universal
remedy for disaster. In particular, the Section describes the
elusive character of objective assessments and policies. Behind
objectivity, facts and universal descriptions lay not only
considerable value judgments but also various means of
politicizing and distorting law and policy.
In addition to harms associated with the manner in which
systematization is wielded, Section III analyzes deeper
concerns endemic to the character of systematization itself.
Namely, it evaluates the latters potential for significantly
17. See HUMAN LINKS TO COASTAL DISASTERS, supra note 5, at 3439.
18. See id. at ixx, 10811.
19. Landis, supra note 6, at 971.
20. See Ben Wisner, Capitalism and the Shifting Spatial and Social
Distribution of Hazard and Vulnerability, AUSTL. J. EMERGENCY MGMT.,
Winter 2001, at 44, 4450.
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distorting or undermining key human, affective, and
motivational facets of effective disaster response. Exclusively
employing or focusing on quantitative assessments and
standardized procedures risks overlooking the substantial role
that affect plays in disaster decision-making. A more accurate,
capacious approach recognizes affective input as essential to
good judgment on behalf of others in crisis, particularly in
relation to empathy and prosocial motivation. Yet, the
character of empathy and its contribution to disaster decision-
making are complex. Groundbreaking psychological and
neuroscientific research can help here by elucidating key
features of empathic and prosocial motivation, particularly as
they relate to aspects of systematization. Section IV then
describes the evidence linking empathy and prosocial helping,
but also addresses potential criticisms of empathy and its role
in policy.
Finally, Section V applies the foregoing analysis of
systematization, empathy, and prosocial motivation to specific
disaster laws, actors, and decision-makers. In particular, the
Section clarifies the ways in which systematization efforts may
unwittingly diminish the publics motivation to volunteer, to
donate resources on behalf of those in need, and to demand
robust government responses to crises. Systematization may
also distort experts and authorities judgments, and render
them less responsive to the needs of communities.
Furthermore, the methods by which disaster is framed in
physical, sociological, and social-constructivist terms also have
relevance to potential reforms. On balance, then, while
systematizing efforts may yield clearer, more coherent laws
and procedures, those efforts may also distort, undermine, or
neglect equally essential human factors of disaster decision-
making and motivation.
I. LAW AND DEFINITIONS OF DISASTER
A. INTERNATIONAL, FEDERAL, AND STATE LAWS CHARACTERIZING
DISASTER
Disasters challenge not just the safety of human beings
and habitats; they rupture patterns of daily living and
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undermine our sense of control over resources and habitats.21
Societies understandably seek in response to reassert control
over not only a particular disaster, but also disasters at a
general, systematic level.22 Although both types of reassertion
are important, the latter has received particular attention
recently. Policy analysts, academics, and lawmakers have
increasingly called for more coherent, systematic disaster
frameworks.23 For example, various authorities have defined
disasters as specific kinds of physical events.24 Others have
equated disasters with assessments of physical impact.25 Still
others have defined them as social constructions of reality,26 or
political responses to crises.27 Some have gone so far as to
21. See HUMAN LINKS TO COASTAL DISASTERS, supra note 5, at 6377
(discussing mental health impacts on disaster victims and community
response to disasters).
22. In the United States, for example, Congress has a long history from as
early as 1790 of appropriating funds for the relief of fires, floods,
earthquakes, and other disasters. Michele Landis Dauber, The Sympathetic
State, 23 LAW &HIST. REV. 387, 391 (2005).
23. See S. COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVT AFFAIRS, HURRICANE
KATRINA: A NATION STILL UNPREPARED, S. REP. NO. 109-322, at 44041, 586
87 (2d Sess. 2006) [hereinafter, SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC.]; Chen,
supra note 14; Yuka Karatani & Haruo Hayashi, Quantitative Evaluation of
Recovery Process in Disaster-Stricken Areas Using Statistical Data, 2 J.
DISASTER RES. 453, 454 (2007); POSNER, supra note 13; THALER & SUNSTEIN,
supra note 13.
24. See RUSSELL R. DYNES & E.L. QUARANTELLI, ORGANIZATIONAL
RESPONSES TO MAJOR COMMUNITY CRISES 11418 (Final Report 15, 1975)
(contrasting natural disasters with civil disturbances based on origin of their
disaster agent, by classifying natural disasters as events that originate
from non-social forces which are external to the community system, in
contrast to civil disturbances as events that originate from social sources
internal to the system).
25. SeeMICHAEL BARKUN, DISASTER AND THEMILLENNIUM 72 (1974).
26. See E.L. Quarantelli, What Is a Disaster? An Agent Specific or an All
Disaster Spectrum Approach to Socio-Behavioral Aspects of Earthquakes?, in
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF EARTHQUAKES AND PLANNING TO
MITIGATE THEIR IMPACTS 453, 46162 (Barclay G. Jones & Miha Tomazevic
eds., 1982) (noting the possibility of disconnect between the magnitude of
physical impact and social disruption, and discussing an example in which
actual damage and loss of life were largely disproportionate to the social
response); see, e.g., JAMES PENICK, JR., THE NEW MADRID EARTHQUAKES OF
18111812, at 10529 (1976) (compiling responses to the earthquakes that
ranged from substantial increases in church congregation sizes to an
escalation of tensions between Native Americans and the U.S. army).
27. WOLF R. DOMBROWSKY, ANOTHER STEP TOWARD A SOCIAL THEORY OF
DISASTER 12, 67 (1981), http://udspace.udel.edu/bitstream
/handle/19716/442/PP70.pdf (characterizing the very concept of disaster as
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depict disasters and response in terms of statistical imbalances
in demand-capability ratios or financial portfolios.28 In related
manner, others disagree over how to characterize risk and
harm.29 In these circumstances, scholars and leaders have
criticized the current lack of integration and systematization as
impeding coordinated responses, generating indecisiveness,
and eroding preparedness.30
Such concerns are not merely academic or restricted to a
few localities.31 For instance, in the Hyogo Framework for
Action 20052015, United Nations member states have
stipulated that efforts to reduce disaster risks must be
systematically integrated into policies, plans and
programmes . . . supported through bilateral, regional and
international . . . partnerships.32 In response, some agencies,
such as the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction, have sought to systematize their disaster protocols
by focusing on loss and the incapacity to respond.33 They have
established a common framework that characterizes disaster
as [a] serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a
society involving widespread human, material, economic or
environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of
the affected community or society to cope using its own
unscientific and only marshaled to foster a politically useful demarcation
between planned for and unplanned for events).
28. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 14, at 1121, 112425 (characterizing
disaster response as a portfolio of rules that creates an efficient governance
response, analogous to the corporate finance portfolio theory of diversified
investing).
29. See Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings (2004), in
THE FEELING OF RISK: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RISK PERCEPTION 21, 2136
(Paul Slovic ed., 2010); Jeanne X. Kasperson, Roger E. Kasperson, Nick
Pidgeon & Paul Slovic, The Social Amplification of Risk: Assessing Fifteen
Years of Research and Theory (2003), in THE FEELING OF RISK: NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON RISK PERCEPTION, supra, at 317, 31744; see, e.g., Dan M.
Kahan et al., Cultural Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology,
4 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 87, 8790 (2009).
30. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., supra note 23; Chen, supra note
8; Farber, supra note 12, at 1786.
31. See Chen, supra note 8, at 1.
32. World Conference on Disaster Reduction, Report of the World
Conference on Disaster Reduction, Resolution 2 Hyogo Framework for Action
20052015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters,
7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.206/6 (Mar. 16, 2005).
33. Terminology, U.N. OFFICE FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION (Aug. 30,
2007), http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology.
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resources.34 Nonetheless, international disparity and lack of
coherence persist. In New Zealand, authorities have framed
disaster in terms of injury, illness, and distress.35 Australian
law-makers, on the other hand, have chosen to define disaster
and response primarily in terms of subjective coping capacity:
disaster is a serious disruption to community life . . . which
is beyond the day-to-day capacity of the prescribed statutory
authorities and which requires special mobilization and
organization of resources other than those normally available
to those authorities.36
Such disparity entails more than mere semantic variation
or differing emphases.37 Vocabularies and concepts that define
hazard and risk can profoundly alter the ways in which
authorities construct or disregard vulnerability.38 They can also
be used to govern spaces shared by human inhabitants,
technologies, and biohazards.39 For example, different countries
take distinct approaches to defining environmental harm based
on standards that focus on appropriate distances as opposed to
consequence-based assessments.40 As German and Swedish
authorities employ the appropriate distances standard, they
require that limited zones pose virtually no risk to human
beings or the environment.41 Conversely, their Belgian and
French counterparts use a consequence-based standard less
sensitive to human exposure to hazards.42 Semantic differences
thus embody not only standardization, but also alternative
preferences for risk that influence what constitutes harm and
34. Id.
35. Civil Defense Emergency Management Act 2002, s 4, subss 6970
(N.Z.); see also Local Government Act 2002 (N.Z.); Building Act 2004 (N.Z.);
and Resource Management Act 1991 (N.Z.).
36. EMERGENCY MGMT. AUSTL., AUSTRALIAN EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
GLOSSARY, pt. 1, manual 3, at 3233 (1998).
37. See Michalis D. Christou et al., The Control of Major Accident
Hazards: The Land-Use Planning Issue, 65 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 151,
15658 (1999).
38. HUMAN LINKS TO COASTAL DISASTERS, supra note 5, at 2939.
39. Id.
40. Christou et al., supra note 37 (noting different approaches among
European Union countries using aspects of consequence-based risk
assessments and/or generic distance categorization for making land-use
planning decisions).
41. Id. at 15860.
42. Id. at 158, 16063.
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what course of action may be required in case of specific
threats.43
Conceptual and definitional variability may be particularly
evident in the United States. In general, responsibility for
defining as well as coordinating and implementing responses
rests with local and state authorities.44 Said authorities may
request federal involvement, but are to do so only in extreme
circumstances where local capacity is overwhelmed.45 The
decentralized character of response protocols stems primarily
from the constitutional emphasis on avoiding concentrated
emergency powers.46 Nonetheless, those areas governed by
federal law are subject to the Stafford Disaster Relief Act
(Stafford Act).47 In addition to stipulating specific relief
provisions and conditional response triggers, the Stafford Act
defines major disaster as:
Any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm,
high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake,
volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or,
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the
United States, which in the determination of the President causes
damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major
disaster assistance under this Act to supplement the efforts and
available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief
organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering
caused thereby.48
The Stafford Act emphasizes presidential power and
prerogative.49 Although the definition enumerates a list of
concrete events that fall under the rubric of disaster, the power
of the definition lies in the subjective declaration of a top
official.50
Apart from basic federal guidelines, various states employ
disparate definitions and response protocols. Some states
43. T. Joseph Scanlon, Forward to WHAT IS A DISASTER? NEW ANSWERS
TO OLD QUESTIONS, supra note 13, at 13, 1416.
44. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 76, 90, 161
67 (2d ed. 2010).
45. See id. at 76, 9092.
46. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 650 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
47. See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 51215207 (2007).
48. Id. at § 5122(2).
49. Id. at §§ 51215207.
50. Id. at §§ 5122, 5131.
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delineate the specific events that constitute disaster.51 Others
use generic phrasing without reference to any specific natural
or man-made occurrences.52 Even among the states that
enumerate events, there is variation in those that qualify as
disaster.53 Perhaps nowhere is state-to-state variability more
clearly manifest than in the amount of license authorities have
to declare whether a particular event qualifies as a disaster. At
one end of the spectrum, state laws provide highly subjective
definitions that give substantial discretion to authorities.
Nevada state regulation, for instance, defines disaster as an
occurrence or threatened occurrence for which, in the
determination of the Governor, the assistance of the Federal
Government is needed.54 Other states such as Connecticut
allow either the Governor or the U.S. President to ascertain
whether a civil preparedness emergency is of sufficient
severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster
assistance.55
Some states narrow the subjective determination and
supply more restricted meaning to disaster qualifications.56
New Jersey statutes, for instance, define disaster as an
unusual incident . . . which endangers . . . health, safety or
resources . . . , and which is or may become too large in scope or
unusual in type to be handled . . . by regular municipal
operating services.57 In like manner, Tennessee codes frame
disaster as an event that will likely exceed local capabilities
and require a broad range of state and federal assistance.58
Strictly speaking, these definitions are less subjective than
51. The state codes of Connecticut, Idaho, New York, and Texas, for
instance, enumerate specific types of natural and man-made disasters. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-1(2) (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 46-1002(3)
(West 2010); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 20, 2(a) (McKinney 2004); TEX GOVT CODE
ANN. § 418.004 (West 2012).
52. New Jersey, North Carolina, and Tennessee, for instance, do not
enumerate specific natural or man-made events that can trigger a disaster
response. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § App. A:9-33.1 (West 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 166A-19.3 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-2-101(4) (2013).
53. For instance, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §20 (McKinney 2004) excludes some
events that TEX GOVT CODE ANN. § 418.004 (West 2012) includes, and vice
versa.
54. NEV. REV. STAT. § 414.0335 (2015).
55. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 28-1 (West 2010).
56. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § App. A:9-33.1 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. §
401.025 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-2-101 (2013).
57. N.J. STAT. ANN. § App. A:9-33.1 (West 2006).
58. TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-2-101 (2013).
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those that define disaster as simply what an executive officer
deems it to be. However, there is still substantial room in
defining an event or situation that is beyond normal capacity.
More concrete are those definitions that frame disasters as
particularly grievous instances of specific occurrences.59 Yet,
even under the seemingly more objective standards, there
remains substantial variability in how states characterize
disasters and coordinate responses to them.
B. POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF GREATER SYSTEMATIZATION
Amidst such lack of theoretical cohesion, clarity, and
coordination, more fully systematizing disaster and risk
management could generate benefits.60 First, systematization
could yield a more universal, shared understanding of disaster
that helps to eliminate unnecessary theoretical confusion.
Some researchers claim that there is a massive disagreement
among [scholars] about what disaster means, with scholars
struggling to define a seemingly commonplace occurrence.61
Experts have expressed frustration at the lack of coordination
between research on risk, hazard, and disaster.62 They have
also condemned the frequent tendency to speak past one
another on the characteristics of the phenomena, the
conditions that lead to them, and the consequences that
result.63 The different vocabularies, academic norms, and
empirical tools that sociologists, economists, engineers, and
59. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 46-1002(3) (West 2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
48-904(d) (1983); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 20 (McKinney 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
166A-19.3 (2013); TEX GOVT CODE ANN. § 418.004 (West 2012).
60. Many have called for more rational, instrumental, and deliberative
approaches to disaster as a means of overcoming the costs of calamity. See,
e.g., POSNER, supra note 13, at 14, 13940 (calling for increased use of cost-
benefit analysis to craft responses to catastrophic risks); Cass R. Sunstein,
Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1063 (2000)
(arguing that cost-benefit analysis of government responses to risk should be
insulated from the non-technical opinions of the public and interest groups
that otherwise dilute government regulations with inefficient preferences that
waste resources).
61. Scanlon, supra note 43, at 16.
62. See Susan L. Cutter, Are We Asking the Right Question?, in WHAT IS A
DISASTER? NEW ANSWERS TO OLD QUESTIONS, supra note 13, at 39, 40.
63. E.L. Quarantelli, Introduction: The Basic Question, Its Importance,
and How It Is Addressed in This Volume, in WHAT IS A DISASTER?
PERSPECTIVES ON THE QUESTION 1, 4 (E.L. Quarantelli ed., 1998).
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lawyers employ increase the potential for misunderstanding.64
Thus, greater systematization could enable theorists and
policy-makers to clarify goals and employ a standardized
vocabulary.65
Second, efforts to better systematize disaster may also
better coordinate communication procedures and guidelines,66
distinguish different groups functions,67 and foster improved
performance-based standards.68 Some have decried the
fail[ure] to articulate clearly which specific actions should be
taken and what components should be utilized.69 Similarly,
some have criticized specific procedures employed in the United
States as fail[ing] to define Federal responsibility
for . . . catastrophic events . . . . [Or to provide] comprehensive
goals along with an integrated means to measure their
progress . . . .70 As implementing relief plans requires clearly
delegated rules and responsibilities for separate agencies or
organizations, systematization could more fully clarify
operating procedures and delineate disaster duties.
Third, more systematic disaster mechanisms and
procedures might offer more coordinated implementation better
able to anticipate new emergencies.71 As global problems grow
more complex, including biogenetic engineering threats, large-
scale food contamination, network technology failures, and
increased viral and bacterial resistance to medical treatment,
greater coordination could better enable disparate communities
from across the globe to tackle these challenges collectively.72
Systematic protocols and operating procedures could also
enable practitioners to manage more adeptly complex decisions
64. See Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Preface, 545 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 8, 811 (1996).
65. See Gilbert F. White, Paths to Risk Analysis, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 171,
17174 (1988).
66. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA:
LESSONS LEARNED 97 (2006).
67. Id. at 102.
68. Id. at 117.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 66.
71. See id. at 51.
72. See generally ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORAS PICNIC BASKET: THE
POTENTIAL AND HAZARDS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (2000); BRUCE
SCHNEIER, SECRETS AND LIES: DIGITAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED WORLD
(2000); Michael Balter, On the Trail of Ebola and Marburg Viruses, 290
SCIENCE 923, 923, 925 (2000).
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when they arise. Evidence suggests that responses to such
catastrophes as Hurricane Katrina were plagued by failures in
coordinated command and communications between
government, responders, and experts.73 Other examples
indicate that assessing which circumstances trigger which type
of response is crucial. Specifically, the United States National
Response Plan (NRP) has been faulted for failing to define the
circumstances under which . . . [disaster] resources would be
delivered.74 Defining the qualifying conditions of disaster and
the rules that govern disaster response could thus enhance
execution, provide legal and analytic consistency, and
strengthen the collective ability to respond to unanticipated
future harm.75
Fourth, greater systematization potentially provides more
quantitative, tractable disaster models and plans.76 Such
techniques may enable researchers and scholars to gauge their
distinct contributions to expanding legal and social capacity
and to lowering environmental hazard and social
vulnerability.77 Advocates contend that more objective
protocols could enable experts and authorities to bring to bear
more rigorous formulas and statistics that
infuse . . . mathematical sophistication into disaster
prevention and relief.78 Such tools, formulas, and portfolios of
legal rules79 could provide better grounds for ascertaining
proper risk assessments, acceptable levels of vulnerability, and
adequate disaster recovery resource allocation.80 Taken
together, these considerations have motivated practitioners,
scholars, and authorities to advocate or develop systematic
disaster management reforms.81
73. Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks
and Balances in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 52223
(2007).
74. THEWHITE HOUSE, supra note 66, at 54.
75. See id. at 151.
76. See Chen, supra note 14, at 112324.
77. Id. at 1130.
78. Id. at 112324.
79. Id.
80. Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory
and Environmental Uncertainty, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 145, 14855 (2003).
81. E.g., Farber, supra note 12, at 178687 (This emerging legal
academic field encompasses a wide-ranging, interdisciplinary body of research
that seeks to inform and improve disaster-related decision-making, as
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II. A BROADER VIEW OF SYSTEMATIZATION
A. THE NUANCE ANDMULTIPLICITY OF SYSTEMATIZING DISASTER
Before wholeheartedly embracing the various calls for
systematization and related reforms, such prospects merit
further scrutiny. In particular, scholars and policy-makers owe
more capacious assessments of both potential systematization
benefits and costs. However, to carefully evaluate the effects of
a potentially vague concept, it will be useful to clarify terms.
Systematization refers to a complex set of tools, procedures,
and goals that aim to rationalize, centralize, or bureaucratize
previously interpersonal or spontaneous human patterns of
action.82 Systematization is related to, but not coterminous
with, preparedness, law, and planning generally.83 In the
context of disaster, the term is also to be distinguished from
mere improvements in efficiency, such as deliberating about
and executing the most effective methods of delivering
resources, enlisting volunteers, and dispersing blood donations
to needy hospitals.84
Instead, in the context of disaster, systematization
comprises the specific 1) formalistic, 2) theoretical, or 3)
substantive mechanisms or methods by which experts, leaders,
or related personnel plan, codify, and implement disaster
evidenced by recent books and a rapidly expanding number of law review
articles. (footnotes omitted)).
82. See MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM 2527 (Talcott Parsons trans., George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1930)
(1905) [hereinafter WEBER, PROTESTANT] (describing rationalization within
western society as occurring with particular values and towards specific ends
rather than any a priori process); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 3336
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Univ. of
Cal. Press 1968) (1921) [hereinafter WEBER, ECONOMY] (describing types of
legitimated order and processes whereby order is established through social
conventions); MAX WEBER, The Profession and Vocation of Politics (1919), in
WEBER: POLITICAL WRITINGS 309, 32831 (Peter Lassman & Ronald Speirs
eds. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) [hereinafter WEBER, POLITICAL
WRITINGS] (describing the historical emergence of administrative officials and
professional politicians and describing the characteristics of rationality their
power relies upon).
83. See Stephen Kalberg, Webers Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for
the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History, 85 AM. J. SOC. 1145, 1177
(1980).
84. See MAX WEBER, The Social Psychology of World Religion (1922
1923), in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra note 1, at 267, 293
(describing rationality in the social system context as different from efficiency,
and instead as a particular orientation towards a valued end).
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prevention and response.85 First, systematization in terms of
formalism involves implementing decisions that are arrived at
without regard to persons,86 or focus on unambiguous general
characteristics of a case in a purely processual manner.87
Examples of formalistic systematization include reforms
aiming to establish a legislative drafting process regarding
disasters,88 formal policy mechanisms to review disaster risk
management systems,89 or comprehensive plans at local, state,
national, and international levels.90 They may also involve
altering land ownership or use by eliminating or repossessing
citizens real or personal property as part of disaster risk
management.91 In addition, public officials may exercise
significant discretion in decisions to ostensibly upgrade urban
settlements under the auspices of formalized methods of
disaster prevention and mitigation.
Although said formalism can be employed to, among other
things, reduce cronyism or bias, within formalized
systematization efforts, who defines disaster and in what
context, which methodologies are employed, and what tradeoffs
are deemed necessary, all heavily influence disaster outcomes,
and in potentially detrimental ways. Similarly, the criteria that
experts select, and the plans that specific events activate will
govern vulnerability as well as resources.92 What is more, the
85. These distinctions are adapted from various scholars analysis of
Webers extensive work on processes of rationalization, and applied to the
context of disaster. They should not be understood here as historical
developments, or specific aspects of distinct political, economic, or social
realms per se, but merely as useful heuristics for practical and conceptual
clarity. See WEBER, PROTESTANT, supra note 82, at 7477, 293; WEBER,
ECONOMY, supra note 82, at 998; Kalberg, supra note 83.
86. Kalberg, supra note 83, at 1158.
87. WEBER, ECONOMY, supra note 82, at 65657.
88. INTL FEDN OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES & UNITED
NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, EFFECTIVE LAW AND REGULATION FOR DISASTER
RISK REDUCTION: A MULTI-COUNTRY REPORT 16 (2014) [hereinafter IFRC &
UNDP].
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id. at xixiii.
91. Id. at 8182.
92. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, ECOLOGY OF FEAR: LOS ANGELES AND THE
IMAGINATION OF DISASTER 539, 6191 (1998) (juxtaposing a history of
rampant development and irregular hazard planning in the Los Angeles
metropolitan area with the regularity of acute and destructive natural
disasters); Fothergill, supra note 7 (discussing the impact of gender in disaster
research and the framing of risk); Landis, supra note 6, at 97172 (discussing
dynamics between perceptions of human agency in disasters and decisions to
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formalized practices of systematization can take on a life of
their own, potentially decoupling disaster practices from basic
ethical commitments.93
Second, systematization can occur at the theoretical level,
wherein individuals employ procedures to impose, wittingly or
not, conceptual meaning on the conditions or significance of
disaster.94 Disasters often constitute unique temporal
conditions that bring chaos and uncertainty into domains
usually governed by protocol and regularized meaning.95 Social
and natural scientists can respond to disasters by developing
holistic explanations or models to impose coherence and
predictability on ostensibly unrelated phenomena.96 Although
generally conveyed in abstract form,97 theoretical
systematization relates directly to disaster in concrete ways.
For instance, legal scholars, economists, and scientists have
advocated or developed more theoretically coherent models of
disaster and risk management.98 Karatani and Hayashi urge
greater statistical efficiency via recovery indices involving
statistical database[s] for calculation of data and better
quantitative analysis of recovery.99 They maintain that
policy-makers can more adequately understand local society
and economy in a region by using corrected macroscopic
statistical data.100 From their perspective, data that is
standardized to comprehend all aspects of life can simplify
the complexity of different cultures, economies, and geographic
allocate resources); Pulido, supra note 7 (establishing the lens of
environmental racism for deconstructing decisions around zoning,
development, and resource allocation).
93. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1564
70 (2002).
94. WEBER, supra note 84.
95. Chen, supra note 14, at 112122.
96. See WEBER, supra note 84, at 27981; WEBER, ECONOMY, supra note
82.
97. See generally WEBER, ECONOMY, supra note 82, at 43233 (discussing
the rationalization of norms from abstract religious concepts).
98. Chen, supra note 14, at 1143; Karatani & Hayashi, supra note 23;
Howard C. Kunreuther & Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Climate Change,
Insurability of Large-Scale Disasters, and the Emerging Liability Challenge,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1813 (2007).
99. Karatani & Hayashi, supra note 23.
100. Id.
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regions, thereby enabling comparison . . . across fields [and]
target setting[s].101
Another theoretical approach recommends a catastrophe
model that is said to capture the hazard, vulnerability, and loss
endemic to a disaster.102 The model enables technicians to
measure risk using probability projections, and to calculate the
costs of physical impact, repairs, and business interruptions.103
By so doing, experts can produce an exceedance probability
curve that ascertains the probability that a certain level of
losses, measurable in dollars of damage, fatalities, illness, or
some other unit of analysis, will be exceeded in a specific
location over a period of time.104 Government agencies then use
these figures to estimate the likelihood that losses to specific
communities or regions from natural disasters will exceed
certain levels, and to plan or respond accordingly.105
An alternative tactic advises characterizing disaster and
response in terms of specific formulas and financial portfolios of
legal rules.106 Drawing upon the International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies approach, the scheme
suggests that disaster is best defined as (Hazard +
Vulnerability) / Capacity.107 The purpose of disaster law from
this perspective is to increase preparedness, expressed as 1 /
Disaster or Capacity / (Hazard + Vulnerability).108 In other
words, preparedness can be calculated by dividing the
numerator performance of legal institutions and rules by the
denominator risk as posed by environmental hazard and social
vulnerability.109 This approach suggests that parties impacted
by and deliberating about disaster behave as rational actors
much like financial investors,110 and thus this approach
enables policy-makers and the body politic to evaluate disaster
policy in the same way that financial risk managers evaluate
the performance of financial portfolios.111 Equations and
101. Id.
102. Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 98, at 1814 fig.3.
103. Id. at 181416.
104. Id. at 1814.
105. Id. at 1815.
106. Chen, supra note 14, at 112122.
107. Id. at 1122.
108. Id. at 112324.
109. Id. at 1124.
110. See id. at 1125, 1143.
111. Id. at 1143.
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portfolios of legal asset rules are thus said to provide
simplified, theoretically coherent exercise[s] in societal risk
management112 that effectively translate the complex
dimensions of disaster into mathematically rigorous terms.113
Third, systematizing disaster at a substantive level may
hinder effective disaster management by imposing
standardized canons against which empirical events may be
selected, measured and judged.114 Systematization can impose
normative significance on disaster by establishing norms of
exclusion,115 and implicit or explicit preferences and values
may legitimate patterns of action or legal structure.116 For
example, individuals can wield asset rules and statistics,117
exceedance probability curves,118 or standardized scales that
comprehend all aspects of life119 not just as descriptions of
events but also as normative prescriptions or requirements. In
this sense, models or definitions can become the accepted,
governing frames that necessitate particular policies, laws, or
resource distribution schemes.120 Where such demands are not
met or canons not recognized, alternatives may be branded as
flawed, biased, and misleading,121 and deviations may be
formally or informally disciplined.122
A prominent example of substantive systematization
occurs in some welfare-maximizing paradigms that serve as
112. Id. at 1121.
113. Id. at 1128.
114. Kalberg, supra note 83, at 1155.
115. SeeWEBER, supra note 84, at 29495.
116. See WEBER, POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra note 82, at 312, 35559
(observing that a form of rationalization in political power exists by virtue of
legality, by virtue of belief in the validity of legal statute . . . founded on
rationally devised rules, but then discussing significant disconnects among
the political class between espoused ends and legitimating means on the one
hand, and ethics on the other).
117. Chen, supra note 14, at 112527.
118. Kunreuther & Michel-Kerjan, supra note 98, at 1814.
119. Karatani & Hayashi, supra note 23.
120. DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY 71 (2010).
121. Id. at 208 (quoting Robert N. Stavins, Comment Letter on Proposed
CWA NPDES Regulations for Cooling Water Intake Structures at Phase II
Existing Facilities, at 3 (July 19, 2002)) (criticizing the cost-benefit analysis
performed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency).
122. Id. at 20913 (resulting in this case with the agency significantly
diluting the regulatory standard to appease critics).
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means of measuring or invalidating regulations or duties.123 As
a seemingly objective method for evaluating proposed disaster
policies or risk assessments,124 cost-benefit analysis is often
justified as neutral to any particular conception of value or
judgment.125 However, at best, such neutrality is an ideal
rather than basic fact about reality. Authorities and experts
can rationalize their particular approaches by applying, for
example, numeric weights to time horizons, or establishing
discount rates that validate specific policies.126 In this manner,
seemingly perfunctory or neutral standardizations can be used
to exclude policy alternatives, promote political projects, or
construct quantitative frameworks that immunize certain
policies from further scrutiny.127
B. THE USES AND ABUSES OF SYSTEMATIZATION
Although as a set of tools, procedures, and goals,
systematization can promote various formal, theoretical, and
substantive aims, it is still no guarantee of optimal results.
First, various past disaster failures have occurred with more
formalized regulatory language, universalized codes, and
centralized authority already in place.128 In fact, some of the
supposed benefits of systematization appear to have hindered
previous disaster responses.129 A common allegation concerning
Katrina held that top government officials argued over too
123. Some employ rationalizing procedures that include normative
elements that dismiss alternative approaches of rationalization as poor,
erroneous, or emotionally distorting. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein,
Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 753 (1999).
124. See RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 10 (2008).
125. Sunstein, supra note 60.
126. Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 93, at 156364.
127. In disaster law and policy literature, such procedures may, but do not
necessarily, include crafting specific social discount rates, willingness-to-pay
calculations, and value-of-statistical-life-years paradigms. See FRANK
ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 14849 (2004); Ackerman &
Heinzerling, supra note 93, at 156365; Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of
Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 19495 (2000); Quarantelli,
supra note 13, at 377; W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 853
(2000).
128. See SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., supra note 23, at 163; THE
WHITE HOUSE, supra note 66, at 14.
129. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., supra note 23, at 164.
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much legal coda and minutiae.130 First-person accounts report
that excessive procedural language and rules left top policy-
makers wrangling over proper authority and delegation,131
thereby hindering a more effective response.
In addition, greater systematization risks undermining
flexibility in times of crisis, inasmuch as attempts to define
and to delineate disaster in precise ways are bound to be
incomplete and even misleading.132 The NRP, for instance,
was faulted for not being adequately designed to address
specific scenarios, and not sufficiently contemplat[ing] an
event on the massive scale of Katrina.133 It is reasonable to
question, however, whether any predetermined set of rules
could function in such a way, as even ardent proponents of
systematization admit that most disasters follow lopsidedly
non-Gaussian distributions.134 The complexities of
overwhelming crises inevitably constrain the extent to which
comprehensive models and protocols can be constructed
precisely a priori.135
Past evidence also suggests that flexibility, autonomy, and
absence of comprehensive systematization can actually
enhance the delivery of services and improve disaster
response.136 For example,
[t]he ability of on-site officials to make quick judgments, informed by
firsthand observations not available to faraway supervisors, might
have greater potential to effect good outcomes in emergencies than
the designation of a federal coordinating officer under the Stafford
Act or the designation of a principal federal official under the
[National Response Framework].137
By extension, many autonomous organizations not fully
integrated into centralized, rigid decision-making apparatuses
have proven highly effective in response to some disasters.138
130. See Ryan, supra note 73, at 52227.
131. See id. at 52527.
132. Philip Buckle, Disaster: Mandated Definitions, Local Knowledge and
Complexity, inWHAT IS A DISASTER? NEW ANSWERS TO OLD QUESTIONS, supra
note 13, at 173, 193.
133. SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., supra note 23, at 554.
134. Chen, supra note 14, at 1124; Farber, supra note 80, at 14855.
135. Chen, supra note 14, at 112122.
136. FARBER ET AL., supra note 44, at 154.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33314, THE
CONGRESSIONAL CHARTER OF THE AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS:
OVERVIEW, HISTORY, AND ANALYSIS 19 (2006).
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First-hand witnesses and research documents reveal that non-
integrated relief agencies have often demonstrated flexible,
efficient deployment of resources in times of disaster.139 Others
have documented numerous organizations that have
contributed effectively to disaster management even without
centralized bureaucracies or highly technical protocols.140
During Katrina various observers recognized the capacity
of private and non-governmental agencies to get . . . assistance
to the disaster areas almost immediately after the [crisis] had
passed, in comparison to the daysin some cases weeksthat
residents waited for government agencies to provide relief.141
The highly effective record of private utility companies
restoring services within days of a disaster illustrates this
point.142 Moreover, during the crisis many private
organizations and hospitals not only provided superior care
services, but even rescued many critically ill patients then
located in government-run hospitals.143 More extensive
bureaucracies or systematized regulations and protocols are
obviously no full-proof panacea, and in some instances may
actually yield suboptimal results.
On a more theoretical level, a structural problem inherent
in systematizing efforts centers on the contrived objectivity
that manifestly subjective and normative determinations are
expected to furnish. One such case involves the most expensive
natural disaster to datethe Tohoku Earthquake and
Tsunamiin which a nuclear reactor in Fukushima, Japan
released substantial amounts of radioactive material,144 caused
139. See Steven Horwitz, Making Hurricane Response More Effective:
Lessons from the Private Sector and the Coast Guard During Katrina,
MERCATUS POLY SERIES, no. 17, March 2008, at 1, 13.
140. See, e.g., id.; KOSAR, supra note 138.
141. Horwitz, supra note 139, at 3.
142. See Transmission and Distribution, Southern Company CEO Shares
Details of Successful Hurricane Katrina Response with Senate Committee, PR
NEWSWIRE (Nov. 16, 2005), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/southern-company-ceo-shares-details-of-successful-hurricane-katrina-
response-with-senate-committee-55644032.html.
143. See HCA Completes Airlift Evacuation at Tulane University Hospitals
and Clinic; Assists Nearby Hospitals, PR NEWSWIRE (Sept. 2, 2005),
http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=63489&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=752385.
144. This was the largest earthquake ever recorded in Japan, and the
fourth largest worldwide since 1900. See Fukushima Accident, WORLD
NUCLEAR ASSN, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-
Security/Safety-of-Plants/Fukushima-Accident/ (last modified Sept. 2015); see
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considerable human suffering, and made extensive amounts of
land uninhabitable.145 Critics have subsequently asked
whether the disaster could have been averted, including
whether there was an objective height at which the seawater
pumps at Fukushima should have been built.146 As a
preliminary answer, Fukushimas own design-based simulation
estimated a tsunami of a maximum 3.1 meters above sea level,
comfortably below the four-meter height at which the station
was located at the time of the tsunami.147 In 2002, experts
employed an updated methodology that estimated a safe
maximum of 5.7 meters.148 When the tsunami struck, however,
it exceeded 17 meters (~55 feet) in height at the reactor site,
and 39 meters (~128 feet) elsewhere on Japans coastline, far
surpassing most recent expert predictions.149 Indeed, when the
earthquake actually struck, its magnitude caught
seismologists by surprise . . . . This significant
underestimation, in spite of Japans considerable investments
in seismology, is a sobering warning against overconfidence in
hazard prediction.150
From the vantage point of pre-2011 estimates, the
Fukushima measurements and wall itself would have appeared
rational, efficient, and quantitatively sound given the relevant
constraints. At the least, citizens and farmers who protested
excessive radioactive exposure or tsunami vulnerability could
also Largest Earthquakes in the World Since 1900, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
(Apr. 11, 2012), http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world
/10_largest_world.php.
145. The costs of the effects of the Fukushima Earthquake and Tsunami
are estimated at more than $300 billion. See Earthquake Summary,
Magnitude 9.0  Near the East Coast of Honshu, Japan, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY, http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews
/2011/usc0001xgp/#summary (last modified Mar. 23, 2015).
146. See JAMES M. ACTON & MARK HIBBS, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTL PEACE, WHY FUKUSHIMA WAS PREVENTABLE 1115 (2012).
147. See Intl Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], IAEA International Fact
Finding Expert Mission of the Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident Following the
Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, at 74 (June 16, 2011).
148. See ACTON &HIBBS, supra note 147, at 910.
149. See TOKYO ELECTRIC POWER CO., REPORT ON INVESTIGATION RESULTS
REGARDING TSUNAMI GENERATED BY THE TOHOKU-TAIHEIYOU-OKI
EARTHQUAKE IN FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI AND DAINI NUCLEAR POWER STATIONS
(July 8, 2011), http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e
/images/110708e18.pdf; Becky Oskin, Japan Earthquake & Tsunami of 2011:
Facts and Information, LIVE SCIENCE (May 7, 2015, 4:52 PM),
http://www.livescience.com/39110-japan-2011-earthquake-tsunami-facts.html.
150. ACTON &HIBBS, supra note 147, at 11.
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have been disregarded as potential alarmists who suffered
cognitive bias.151 Yet, the legal question remains whether
substantive, theoretical, and formalist mechanisms and efforts
unduly exposed citizens to harm and created a false procedural
or mathematical assurance that misled authorities and citizens
alike. Similar questions have been posed after design bases of
nuclear plants in France, India, the United States, and
elsewhere failed to manage earthquake and flood damage.152
Even more troublesome, in determining liability, on what basis
might authorities determine legal responsibility outside or
beyond the very numbers, measurements, and tools at issue in
the first place? Such questions are not mere academic
exercises; since the 2006 LAquila earthquake hit Italy, for
example, judges have had to determine whether scientists and
authorities were criminally responsible for failing to adequately
assess LAquilas risks and for providing false assurances.153
Beyond the basic tenuousness of putative objective
assessments, systematizing frameworks often conceal value
judgments and preferences.154 Because numerical estimates of
risks, costs, and benefits are [rarely] impartial reflections of
factual reality,155 at numerous junctures of decision-making,
simply employing alternative assumptions, valuation
techniques, discount rates, and other seemingly technical
trappings can dramatically alter normative assessments.156
The same considerations apply to evaluations of risk since
[h]uman beings have invented the concept of risk to help
them understand and cope with the dangers and uncertainties
151. For instance, in the earlier LAquila earthquake of Italy in 2006, the
Italian Director of Civil Defense denounced those who feared an imminent
earthquake in the region as alarmist and causing fear. See Aidan Lewis,
Row over Italian Quake Forecast, BBC NEWS ONLINE (Apr. 6, 2009, 6:31 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7986585.stm; Marta Falconi, Strong Quake
in Italy Kills Over 150, Wounds 1,500, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 7, 2009.
152. See ACTON & HIBBS, supra note 147. Nor is Japan an anomaly: the
design bases of nuclear plants to handle earthquakes and floods have been
exceeded in France, India, Japan, and the United States.
153. See Nicola Nosengo, Italian Court Finds Seismologists Guilty of
Manslaughter, NATURE NEWS (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.nature.com/news
/italian-court-finds-seismologists-guilty-of-manslaughter-1.11640.
154. Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE
L.J. 1981, 206468 (1998).
155. Id. at 2068.
156. Douglas A. Kysar, Politics by Other Meanings: A Comment on
Retaking Rationality Two Years Later, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 43, 47 (2011).
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of life. Although these dangers are real, there is no such thing
as real risk or objective risk.157
Scholars, leaders, and policy-makers do not formulate
models or regulations ex nihilo. Identity and the perspectives
employed in disaster decision-making impact the dynamics
within which tools, measurements, and statistical benchmarks
are developed to respond to or mitigate disaster.158 Because
different specialists import distinct sets of assumptions and
tools for problem solving, who dominates the committees or
decision-making apparatuses can significantly influence
outcomes. If economists are in charge of crafting procedures or
models of disaster, they are unlikely to treat the same set of
facts as sociologists, engineers, or lawyers would. Similarly,
decision-making controlled disproportionately by religious,
ethnic, racial or socio-economic groups can bias outcomes.159
Although some may downplay such concerns since quantifying
risk and value is agnostic on the deep issues,160 these
influences can nonetheless transform the distribution of
resources and the urgency of response.161 Even the choice of a
technical phrase or method of measurement can determine
which risks are acceptable, and which communities receive
aid.162
Normative frameworks that give the appearance of
objectivity may not only conceal implicit preferences, but also
provide cover for political and personal agendas. A potential
result of increased reliance on quantification in setting
regulatory policy will be that the side that best obscures the
157. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 141 (2011) (quoting
PAUL SLOVIC, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics and Science: Surveying the Risk-
Assessment Battlefield, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 390, 392 (2000)).
158. See Veronique Bruggeman, Capital Market Instruments for Natural
Catastrophe and Terrorism Risks: A Bright Future?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10136
(2010); Susan L. Cutter, Bryan J. Boruff & W. Lynn Shirley, Social
Vulnerability to Environmental Hazards, 84 SOC. SCI. Q. 242 (2003);
Christopher M. Lewis & Peter O. Davis, Capital Market Instruments for
Financing Catastrophe Risk: New Directions?, 17 J. INS. REG. 110 (1998).
159. See DYNES & QUARANTELLI, supra note 24, at 1219 (noting disparate
responses in defining and responding to civil disturbances in communities
based on racial and economic factors).
160. Sunstein, supra note 60, at 1077.
161. See Landis, supra note 6, at 971.
162. See generally MARVIN OLASKY, THE POLITICS OF DISASTER: KATRINA,
BIG GOVERNMENT, AND A NEW STRATEGY FOR FUTURE CRISES 948 (2006);
Buckle, supra note 132, at 177.
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value choices implicit in its numbers will prevail.163 Moreover,
when subjective value judgments are couched in objective
language, assessments, or measurements, authorities and
elites often enjoy greater liberty to bypass deliberative,
democratic processes. Some authorities may even see their top-
down decision-making as insulating government from the
publics misinformed judgments164 that should be resist[ed]
in the name of democracy.165
As a general rule, employing substantive canons in order to
invalidate or dismiss alternative perspectives or methods is
rarely necessary or helpful.166 Nonetheless, formalistic
systematization that strengthens decision-making made
without regard to persons in a purely procedural manner might
avoid partiality. In federal disaster relief allocations, for
instance, U.S. states with congressional representation in
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) oversight
committees tend to receive higher levels of disaster relief.167
Moreover, as shown in Figure 1, presidential declarations of
disaster increase substantially during election years,
controlling for the number and severity of actual disasters.168
Even politically competitive election battleground states have
higher rates of disaster declarations.169 For example, during
election years, those battleground states with twenty electoral
votes or more are twice as likely to receive presidential disaster
relief as states with only three electoral votes.170 To many
observers, formalistic measures might attenuate this
unprincipled, albeit legal, behavior.
163. Heinzerling, supra note 155, at 2068.
164. Sunstein, supra note 60, at 106366.
165. Id. at 1074.
166. RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHARON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 7779 (2d ed. 2011) (describing substantive canons as
offering only a rebuttable presumption of meaning).
167. Thomas A. Garrett & Russell S. Sobel, The Political Economy of
FEMA Disaster Payments, 41 ECON. INQUIRY 496, 49899 (2003).
168. Howard Kunreuther et al., Overcoming Decision Biases to Reduce
Losses from Natural Catastrophes, in THE BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF
PUBLIC POLICY. 398, 40708 (Eldar Shafir ed., 2013).
169. Garrett & Sobel, supra note 168, at 504.
170. Andrew Reeves, Plucking Votes from Disasters, L.A. TIMES, May 12,
2004, at B13.
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Figure 1.171 Number of presidential declarations of disaster by year.
Overall, not only have the number of declarations increased since
the mid-1950s, but also many peak numbers of declarations have
coincided with presidential election years.
In reality, however, ensuring that authorities actually
pursue impartial, benevolent policies is fraught with challenge.
In fact, government officials may actually manipulate disaster
declarations or protocols in order to promote personal or
political strategies. Some leaders have refused to declare
disasters in order to further their own agenda despite the
protests of international observers.172 Other leaders have used
disaster declarations to prevent foreign involvement in
domestic affairs, or to distribute resources to citizens
complaining of corruption or poor economic policies largely
unrelated to any disaster per se.173 More alarming, some
political and military authorities have used declarations of
171. Figure from Kunreuther et al., supra note 169, at 407, data originally
from Erwann O. Michel-Kerjan, Toward a New Risk Architecture: The
Question of Catastrophe Risk Calculus, 75 SOC. RES. 819, 824 (2008). The
number of federally declared disasters tends to spike on Presidential election
years.
172. See Ellen Freudenheim, Politics in International Disasters: Fact, Not
Fiction, in DISASTER ASSISTANCE: APPRAISAL, REFORM AND NEW APPROACHES
225, 226 (Lynn H. Stephens & Stephen J. Green eds., 1979).
173. See id.
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disaster to seize political power.174 On balance, then, greater
substantive systematization may promote formalistic
neutrality, but also indirectly foster personal and political
legerdemain. When overt attempts at political maneuvering are
too apparent, objective assessments and measurements can
be exceptionally useful.175
III. THE ROLE OF AFFECT AND EMPATHY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
In addition to harms associated with the manner in which
systematization is wielded, there are additional, deeper
concerns regarding the character of systematization itself.
Namely, systematization risks ignoring or undermining key
human, affective, and motivational dimensions essential to
effective disaster response. A more capacious approach will
recognize affective input and empathy as essential to good
decision-making and policy. However, empathy and its
contribution to disaster decision-making involve complex
processes. Groundbreaking psychological and neuroscientific
research is thus useful because it elucidates key empathic and
prosocial processes, and concretely explains related
determinants of empathy.
A. THE INDISPENSABLE ROLE OF AFFECT IN DECISION-MAKING
AND DISASTER RESPONSE
Affect plays an essential but underappreciated role in
human judgment and risk perceptions.176 Historically much
174. See, e.g., Laurie Wiseberg, An International Perspective on the African
Famines, in THE POLITICS OF NATURAL DISASTER: THE CASE OF THE SAHEL
DROUGHT 101, 102, 10711 (Michael H. Glantz ed., 1976) (alleging that elites
within the Ethiopian government and those in locally powerful economic
positions used the disaster situation for reasons of self-enrichment or political
gain).
175. One cannot, without more, presume that greater systematization or
numeracy will necessarily enable irreproachable experts or regulatory agents
to bypass political machinations. Indeed, one of the central purposes of
imposing statistical, economic or other systematic analyses upon law and
policy is to guarantee political control and ensure that elected officials
maintain power over agency regulation. See Eric Posner, Controlling Agencies
with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1137, 1141 (2001).
176. See Gisela Bohm & Wibecke Brun, Intuition and Affect in Risk
Perception and Decision Making, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 1, 1 (2008)
(explaining that [i]ntuition and affect have been neglected topics in the
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analysis of human judgment has ignored or denigrated the role
of emotion in decision-making as deleterious or distorting.177
Scholars and decision-makers in the past have suggested that
deliberative and calculating aspects obtain[ed] the best
results, [while] emotions must be kept out.178 In other words,
emotions are irrational and unhelpful to accurate judgment.179
Fortunately, various scientists and researchers have begun to
adopt a more expansive view of decision-making.180 A growing
literature indicates that affect influences the anticipation of
future consequences.181 Affect appears to guide decision-
making through presently-experienced emotions, and
individuals often make evaluative decisions by asking
themselves how they feel about particular circumstances or
conditions.182 Such influences may even alter cognition and
behavior outside of direct awareness.183 Research on affective
forecasting even indicates that emotion influences behavior in
literature on human judgment and decision making for a long time); see also
Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 741, 766 (2008) (claiming that [i]t is settled at this point that emotions
play a critical role in the cognition of risk); George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk
as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 267-86 (2001).
177. See Robert C. Solomon, The Philosophy of Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF
EMOTIONS 3, 38 (Michael Lewis & Jeanette M. Havilland eds., 1993). See
generally James G. March, Bounded Rationality, Ambiguity and the
Engineering Of Choice, 9 BELL J. ECON. 587 (1978).
178. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND
THE HUMAN BRAIN 171 (1994).
179. See id.
180. See Kahan, supra note 177; Paul Slovic & Ellen Peters, Risk
Perception and Affect, 15 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 322, 322 (2006).
See generally Antoine Bechara et al., Deciding Advantageously Before
Knowing the Advantageous Strategy, 275 SCIENCE 1293 (1997); David E. Bell,
Regret in Decision-Making Under Uncertainty, 30 OPERATIONS RES. 961
(1982); Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, Feelings and Phenomenal
Experiences, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 385
(Arie W. Kruglanski & E. Tory Higgins eds., 2d ed. 2007).
181. Bell, supra note 181, at 961; Andrew Caplin & John Leahy,
Psychological Expected Utility Theory and Anticipatory Feelings, 116 Q.J.
ECON. 55, 7374 (2001); Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Disappointment
and Dynamic Consistency in Choice Under Uncertainty, 53 REV. ECON. STUD.
271, 275 (1986).
182. See Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, How Do I Feel About It? The
Informative Function of Affective States, in AFFECT, COGNITION AND SOCIAL
BEHAVIOR 44, 4462 (Klaus Fiedler & Joseph Forgas eds., 1988).
183. See Rajagopal Raghunathan & Michel Tuan Pham, All Negative
Moods Are Not Equal: Motivational Influences of Anxiety and Sadness on
Decision Making, 79 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 56, 5758
(1999).
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the present differently than it does behavior in the future, with
important consequences for decision-making.184
Among the more prominent conceptions of decision-making
today are those positing two parallel systemsone cold and
deliberative, the other hot and affective.185 As the
deliberative system decides analytically and rationally, the
affective system does so intuitively and automatically.186 A key
dimension of the affective system is the affect heuristic or
perceptions of risk as feelings.187 Research on the affect
heuristic shows that emotional reactions to high-risk situations
frequently diverge from those elicited by similar situations
presented (or cognitively processed) in cold, deliberative
terms.188 Use of affect tends to be swifter and more expedient
in navigating dangerous situations or those involving
uncertainty.189 Compared with colder calculations, affective
responses are connected to the vividness of experience,
temporal proximity, and additional variables not limited solely
to rational deliberation.190
Affect imbues decisions about risks and benefits associated
with particular behaviors or technologies. In one study,
researchers found that the perceived risks correlated with the
184. See George F. Loewenstein, A Visceral Account of Addiction, in
GETTING HOOKED 235, 23842 (Jon Elster & Ole-Jorgen Skog eds., 1999).
185. See GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN & TED ODONOGHUE, ANIMAL SPIRITS:
AFFECTIVE AND DELIBERATIVE PROCESSES IN ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 1821
(May 2005) (unpublished manuscript), https://odonoghue.economics.cornell
.edu/will.pdf (indicating that this dual view is widely accepted by both
cognitive and social psychologists).
186. See Seymour Epstein, Integration of the Cognitive and the
Psychodynamic Unconscious, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 711 (1994).
187. Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks
and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 3 (2000); Loewenstein, supra
note 177.
188. See generally JAAK PANKSEPP, AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE (1998);
Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldview as Orienting
Dispositions in the Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1427 (1996).
189. See Slovic & Peters, supra note 181, at 322.
190. See Loewenstein et al., supra note 177, at 280. However, caution is in
order. Any rigid bifurcations of coldhot and rationalemotional decision-
making contradict significant research demonstrating overlapping, spectral,
and symbiotic relations between the putative binaries. See generally Jay D.
Aronson, The Laws Use of Brain Evidence, 6 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 93, 100
(2010).
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magnitude of positive or negative ratings of the activity.191 As
such, feelings as much as cognitive evaluations inform risk
assessments. Moreover, affect may partially govern deliberate
cognitive assessments. For example, researchers conducted
experiments in which individuals were informed of new
benefits of a particular technology that poses risks to society.192
As individuals identified greater benefits to the technology,
they experienced more positive affect about it, and later rated
its risks as lower, even though said benefits were irrelevant to
the risks.193
Not only is affect a constituent dimension of risk
perception and decision-making, it is also essential for good
judgment.194 Many affective skeptics, although admitting that
affect plays a role in decision-making, have suggested that it
does so in a largely biasing way, and may require correction by
those in authority.195 Affective skepticism has been
communicated in terms of irrational weigher, biased
decision-maker, and libertarian paternalist models.196 From
191. See Ali S. Alhakami & Paul Slovic, A Psychological Study of the
Inverse Relationship Between Perceived Risk and Perceived Benefit, 14 RISK
ANALYSIS 1085 (1994).
192. See id.; see also Finucane et al., supra note 188, at 4.
193. See Alhakami & Slovic, supra note 192; see also Finucane et al., supra
note 188, at 4.
194. Affect does not, however, always yield improvements in decision-
making. For instance, affect may encourage individuals to underestimate the
chance of future hazards, thereby leading to underinvestment in adequate
precaution. See, e.g., DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, THE GREAT DELUGE: HURRICANE
KATRINA, NEW ORLEANS, AND THEMISSISSIPPI GULF COAST 370 (2006).
195. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 17
31 (1997) (describing individual preference formation and decision-making but
justifying the collective controls of personal preference in the public sphere);
RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS 70 (1994) (dismissing the
effect of negative affect or positive mood on decision-making as an
alternative explanation for observed behaviors around risk); THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 19596.
196. SUNSTEIN, supra note 196, at 26165 (discussing people who
irrationally weigh the value of goods when making decisions on comparably
diverse goods under different conditions and contexts); THALER, supra note
196 at 274 (discussing how investors may react irrationally to financial news
with excessive optimism or pessimism, thereby causing stock prices to
temporarily depart from their underlying fundamental values); THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 46, 7273 (introducing the concept libertarian
paternalism). See generally Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two
Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996);
Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral
Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003).
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these perspectives, emotion distorts judgment and impedes the
proper use of probabilities, statistics, and other calculations.197
In contrast to the skeptics, a number of psychology, law,
and social science experts hold that affect plays a central,
salutary role in decision-making.198 These affective inclusivists
acknowledge that judgments of value draw upon emotional
inputs and shared cultural worldviews.199 For them, rather
than distort judgment and behavior, affective input constitutes
an essential element of cognition, awareness, and reliable
judgment.200 By extension, an essential goal of risk
management involves addressing and working within the
value-based frameworks of local populations and not
dismissing their views and perceptions as defects in human
reasoning or irrational cognitive blunders.201
Amidst these disagreements, interlocutors often tacitly
posit a dichotomy opposing impartial calculations or
frameworks against sentiment and its potential for error and
excess.202 Inherent within said judgments is an overly
simplistic distinction between cognition and affect in decision-
making. A more accurate view considers cognitive appraisal as
guiding emotion and modifying information regarding the
situations and factors that elicit affective responses.203
Moreover, affective input thoroughly imbues choice and
197. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 6488 (2005).
198. See Alhakami & Slovic, supra note 192; Kahan, supra note 177, at 741
(explaining that emotion is a perceptive faculty well-suited to forming
adequate evaluations of risk for decision-making); Loewenstein et al., supra
note 177, at 280; Slovic & Peters, supra note 181, at 32425.
199. See Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of
Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1072, 108788 (2006) (reviewing
SUNSTEIN, supra note 198). See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS
OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS (2001).
200. See Donald Braman et al., Modeling Facts, Culture, and Cognition in
the Gun Debate, 18 SOC. JUST. RES. 283, 285 (2005).
201. See Kahan et al., supra note 200, at 110406.
202. See Walter Isaacson, Sometimes, Right Makes Might, TIME, Dec. 21,
1992, at 1; Paul Bloom, The Baby in the Well, NEW YORKER, May 20, 2013, at
118.
203. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Klaus R. Scherer, Appraisal Processes in
Emotion, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 572, 573 (Richard J.
Davidson et al. eds., 2003); Ira J. Roseman & Craig A. Smith, Appraisal
Theory: Overview, Assumptions, Varieties, Controversies, in APPRAISAL
PROCESSES IN EMOTION: THEORY, METHODS, RESEARCH 3, 15 (Klaus R.
Scherer et al. eds., 2001).
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decision-making.204 Neuroscientists have demonstrated that
optimal choices actually rely on nonconscious affective input to
guide deliberative forms of cognition.205 They observed patients
who had suffered damage to areas of the brain directly involved
in affective, emotional input to decision-making, namely, the
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC).206 Subjects performed
a gambling task in which they could earn or lose money by
turning over cards that indicated gain or loss.207 Different
decks contained different probabilities of success.208 As subjects
played, researchers found that both those with and without
VMPFC damage avoided high-paying decks immediately after
encountering penalty cards.209 However, compared with
controls, those with VMPFC damage returned to the high-
paying decks more quickly after suffering a loss, resulting in
more frequent bankruptcy despite a rational understanding of
the rules of the game.210 In other words, lack of affective input
hindered their decision-making ability, and led to poorer
choices.
Affect is also necessary for good decision-making on behalf
of others. Researchers examined individual decisions regarding
risk when the decision-makers themselves, close consociates, or
abstract others would be impacted by the decisions.211 Whereas
affect guided participants in making risk-averse decisions on
behalf of themselves and close consociates, it did not appear to
do so on behalf of abstract others.212 The researchers concluded
that when people make decisions involving risk, they tend to
determine their own affective reaction and then apply that to
others decision-making.213 Conversely, affective projection is
more difficult for decisions made on behalf of strangers or
abstractions, and decision-makers tend to be less careful or
204. See DAMASIO, supra note 179; Dacher Keltner & Jonathan Haidt,
Social Functions of Emotions, in EMOTIONS: CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS 192 (Tracy J. Mayne & George A. Bonanno eds., 2001).
205. Bechara et al., supra note 181, at 1294.
206. Id. at 1293.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 129394.
210. Id.
211. Cristopher K. Hsee & Elke U. Weber, A Fundamental Prediction
Error: Self-Others Discrepancies in Risk Preference, 126 J. EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 45, 5053 (1997).
212. Id.
213. Id.
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concerned about these decisions. Additional studies confirm
that people rely on their own emotional response to a given
situation in order to understand the needs or perspectives of
others.214 In other words, failure to share others perspectives
or affective feelings hinders the ability to optimally decide on
their behalf.
Affect is particularly important to decision-making
regarding disasters,215 and is essential to understanding large,
complex problems . . . that we cannot apprehend through
quantitative information alone.216 At a basic level, research
indicates that individuals draw upon affect elicited by thinking
about disasters to infer risk, harm, and other elements of a
calamitous situation.217 Affect influences disaster decision-
making directly by motivating behavior,218 and indirectly by
making salient important considerations regarding mortality,
social relations, and ethical duties.219 Affective input is
particularly beneficial for navigating the complexities,
uncertainties, and high-pressure demands of crises when
prolonged deliberation is impracticable.220 Furthermore,
decision-makers often face copious information, conflicting
signals, high stakes, and numerous environmental
constraints.221 In these conditions, crisis decision-making
characterized by formal rules and procedures [may need to
give] way to informal processes . . . [that] may not take place
214. See Yoshiya Moriguchi et al., Empathy and Judging Others Pain: An
fMRI Study of Alexithymia, 17 CEREBRAL CORTEX 2223, 2232 (2007).
215. See Daniel Vastfjall et al., The Affect Heurstic, Mortality Salience, and
Risk: Domain-Specific Effects of a Natural Disaster on Risk-Benefit Perception,
55 SCANDINAVIAN J. PSYCHOL. 527, 530 (2014).
216. Slovic & Slovic, supra note 2, at 18.
217. See Vastfjall et al., supra note 216.
218. See Hasida Ben-Zur & Moshe Zeidner, Threat to Life and Risk-Taking
Behaviors: A Review of Findings and Explanatory Models, 13 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 109, 113 (2009); Alice M. Isen, Positive Affect and
Decision Making, in RESEARCH ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING:
CURRENTS, CONNECTIONS, AND CONTROVERSIES 509, 51921 (William M.
Goldstein & Robin M. Hogarth eds., 1997).
219. See Fung & Carstensen, supra note 8, at 274; Daniel Vastfjall et al.,
Affect, Risk Perception and Future Optimism After the Tsunami Disaster, 3
JUDGMENT & DECISIONMAKING 64, 64 (2008).
220. See Lisa Sayegh et al., Managerial Decision-Making Under Crisis: The
Role of Emotion in an Intuitive Decision Process, 14 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT.
REV. 179, 180, 196 (2004).
221. See Uriel Rosenthal & Paul t Hart, Experts and Decision Makers in
Crisis Situations, 12 KNOWLEDGE 350, 354 (1991).
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according to previously arranged standard operating
procedures.222 Admittedly, unguided or extreme affective
reactions can distort proper decision-making, and few
recommend that emotional reactions predominate entirely
untethered from constructive deliberation and pragmatic
reasoning.223 Nonetheless, during and subsequent to crisis,
insightful, adaptive judgment will depend, at least in part, on
emotional intelligence and affective competence.
B. COGNITIVE, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND NEUROLOGICAL
DIMENSIONS OF EMPATHY
Decisions regarding disaster almost invariably require
judgments made on behalf of others: what other individuals
need, what risks they confront, and what methods will best
mitigate the threats or harms facing them. As such, decision-
makers capacity to understand and incorporate the perspective
of actual or potential victims into their efforts amidst
uncertainty and limited resources is essential. Moreover,
individuals proficiency in acting with concern regarding others
harm and distress is vital as well. In other words, empathy
figures prominently among the various ways in which affect
influences decision-making and engagement prior to, during,
and after disaster. In its most basic form, empathy is an
affective reaction that emanates from the awareness of
anothers emotional state or condition, and mirrors what the
other person is actually feeling or is perceived to feel.224
Generally, individuals who empathize will identify or
commiserate with others, ponder what they are thinking and
feeling, and in some form engage with the adversity of
others.225 Empathy is an essential motivator and proximate
222. Id. at 346.
223. Slovic & Peters, supra note 181, at 325 (indicating that although
affect is a sophisticated mechanism enabling people to respond to situations, it
can sometimes lead people to judge probabilities and consequences
inaccurately).
224. See Nancy Eisenberg, Richard A. Fabes & Tracy L. Spinrad, Prosocial
Development, in 3 HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOLOGY 646, 647 (William
Damon et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006).
225. See Craig A. Anderson et al., Violent Video Game Effects on
Aggression, Empathy, and Prosocial Behavior in Eastern and Western
Countries: A Meta-Analytic Review, 136 PSYCHOL. BULL. 151, 157 (2010);
Frans B.M. de Waal, Putting the Altruism Back into Altruism: The Evolution
of Empathy, 59 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 279, 281 (2008); Stephanie D. Preston &
Frans B.M. de Waal, Empathy: Its Ultimate and Proximate Bases, 25 BEHAV.
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mechanism of altruistic behavior,226 as feelings of empathy
tend to motivate individuals to reduce the suffering of others,
even when costly.227 Even though paid personnel play a
primary role in disaster prevention and relief, empathy,
political support, and community involvement remain vital.228
Whether those with resources and power respond with concern
towards the plight of others, give generously, demand political
action, and take the needs of victims seriously will significantly
impact the well-being of entire communities.
Despite its importance in disaster, empathy is a complex
set of social, psychological, and physiological processes
involving various mediating factors, sentiments, and social
capacities.229 On one hand, said complexity constitutes a
challenge to intellectually clarifying empathys character,
elucidating the relationship of constituent parts and
distinguishing it from related psychological constructs.230 On
& BRAIN SCI. 1, 2 (2002). See generally MARTIN L. HOFFMAN, EMPATHY AND
MORAL DEVELOPMENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR CARING AND JUSTICE (2000).
226. See Eric L. Stocks et al., Altruism or Psychological Escape: Why Does
Empathy Promote Prosocial Behavior?, 39 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 649, 64950
(2009); Deborah A. Small & Nicole M. Verrochi, The Face Of Need: Facial
Emotion Expression on Charity Advertisements, 46 J. MARKETING RES. 777,
778 (2009); Bernard Weiner, A Cognitive (Attribution)-Emotion-Action Model
of Motivated Behavior: An Analysis of Judgments of Help-Giving, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 186, 198 (1980). See generally C. DANIEL
BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARD A SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANSWER (1991). The term prosocial helping is generally employed in this
article to mean voluntary behavior that benefits another or improves her
welfare, well-being, or happiness, often in situations of need or vulnerability.
The term is used here interchangeably with altruism. See Nancy Eisenberg
& Paul A. Miller, The Relation of Empathy to Prosocial and Related Behaviors,
101 PSYCHOL. BULL. 91, 91 (1987). See generally BIBB LATANE & JOHN M.
DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER: WHY DOESNT HE HELP? (1970).
227. See Preston & de Waal, supra note 226.
228. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, A CITIZENS GUIDE TO
DISASTER ASSISTANCE 5-1 (2003), http://training.fema.gov
/EMIWeb/downloads/IS7complete.pdf.
229. See Amy Coplan, Understanding Empathy: Its Features and Effects, in
EMPATHY: PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 3 (Amy
Coplan & Peter Goldie eds., 2011); Paul D. Hastings et al., We Are, By Nature,
Moral Creatures: Biological Bases of Concern for Others, in HANDBOOK OF
MORAL DEVELOPMENT 483, 484 (Melanie Killen & Judith G. Smetana eds.,
2006); Preston & de Waal, supra note 226.
230. See, e.g., C. Daniel Batson, These Things Called Empathy: Eight
Related but Distinct Phenomena, in THE SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE OF EMPATHY
3 (Jean Decety & William Ickes eds., 2009); Jean Decety & Jason M. Cowell,
Friends or Foes: Is Empathy Necessary for Moral Behavior, 9 PERSP. ON
PSYCHOL. SCI. 525, 526 (2014).
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the other hand, interpersonal engagement, social decision-
making, and prosocial attitudes are essential to disaster and
response, thus making a proper understanding of said
complexities and how they relate to law and policy imperative.
Acknowledging both the challenges and importance of
understanding empathy, from a law and policy perspective it is
perhaps most useful to conceive of empathy as a constellation
of aims or goals that rely on emotive responses and social
skills.231 Said constellation can include imagining anothers
inner feelings, taking anothers perspective, and experiencing
concern commensurate with anothers emotions and needs.232
Although automatic reactions may be involved, cognitive
appraisal and mental or emotional effort are usually required
for accurate, meaningful empathizing.233 Specifically, because
empathy involves a complex set of dynamics,234 engendering
genuine, motivating empathy entails specific factors.235 First,
individuals adversely affected by disaster will often evince
vocal concern, emotional distress, and indications of need
associated with their condition, which can trigger or provide a
basis for anothers empathic reaction.236 In most cases, victims
and witnesses indeed feel significantly threatened by disaster
and exhibit high levels of distress.237 Those experiencing a
231. See Claus Lamm et al., The Neural Substrate of Human Empathy:
Effects of Perspective-Taking And Cognitive Appraisal, 19 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 42, 43 (2007); Bill Underwood & Bert Moore, Perspective-
Taking and Altruism, 91 PSYCHOL. BULL. 143, 14445 (1982).
232. See BATSON, supra note 227; Stephen Darwall, Empathy, Sympathy,
Care, 89 PHIL. STUD. 261, 264 (1998); Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B.
Moskowitz, Perspective-Taking: Decreasing Stereotype Expression, Stereotype
Accessibility, and In-Group Favoritism, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
708, 708 (2000).
233. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Why Did Tinkerbell Get Off So Easy?: The
Roles of Imagination and Social Norms in Excusing Human Weakness, 42
TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 428 (2009) (characterizing empathy as requiring effort
and education).
234. See Batson, supra note 231, at 39.
235. See Lian T. Rameson & Matthew D. Lieberman, Empathy: A Social
Cognitive Neuroscience Approach, 3 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS
94, 9496 (2009); see also Batson, supra note 231.
236. See Rameson & Lieberman, supra note 236, at 10205.
237. See Joseph T.F. Lau et al., Impacts of Media Coverage on the
Community Stress Level in Hong Kong After the Tsunami on 26 December
2004, 60 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 675, 675, 68082 (2006);
Sigridur B. Thormar et al., The Mental Health Impact of Volunteering in A
Disaster Setting: A Review, 198 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 529, 529
(2010).
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disaster even increase risk of deterioration in mental and
physical health,238 particularly acute stress, psychological
trauma, and post-traumatic stress disorder.239 Addressing
psychological and emotional elements of disaster is important
in its own right, but is also noteworthy in terms of identifying
disasters social meaning.
An additional factor involves compassionately reacting to
the concern of others.240 In relation to potential impediments,
empathizing will depend on successfully sharing corresponding
feelings, appropriating anothers distress, or vicariously
experiencing anothers plight.241 In psychological terms, this
may comprise sharing anothers perspective or affective
experience as the other person feels or as one would feel in her
place.242 Physiological components are involved too:
empathizers often experience an increase in skin conductance
responses (SCRs) while observing the distress of othersa sign
of distress similar to that elicited by personal suffering.243 The
measured level of SCRs correlates with later willingness to
help the victim.244 Empathizers and those they observe in
distress also show synchronized salivary cortisol levelsa key
indicator of stress.245 Empathizers have also been found to
respond to facial expressions of pain with comparable
expressive behavior.246 Using electromyograph (EMG)
238. See Lau et al., supra note 238, at 676; Thormar et al., supra note 238,
at 529.
239. See Fran H. Norris et al., 60,000 Disaster Victims Speak; An
Empirical Review of the Empirical Literature, 1981-2001, 65 PSYCHIATRY 207,
211 (2002).
240. See Ralph Adolphs, Social Cognition and the Human Brain, 3 TRENDS
COGNITIVE SCI. 469, 476 (1999); Decety & Cowell, supra note 231, at 529.
241. See Decety & Cowell, supra note 231, at 529 (claiming that empathy
entails becoming affectively aroused by others emotions (at least in valence,
tone, or relative intensity)); see also BATSON, supra note 227; Adolphs, supra
note 241, at 476; Batson, supra note 231, at 48.
242. See Adolphs, supra note 241, at 477; Preston & de Waal, supra note
226, at 2.
243. See Grit Hein et al., Skin Conductance Response to the Pain of Others
Predicts Later Costly Helping, 6 PLOS ONE 1, 35 (2011).
244. See id.
245. See Tony W. Buchanan et al., The Empathic, Physiological Resonance
of Stress, 7 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 191, 191 (2012).
246. See Katherine Burns Vaughan & John T. Lanzetta, Vicarious
Instigation and Conditioning of Facial Expressive and Autonomic Responses to
a Models Expressive Display of Pain, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
909, 909 (1980).
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recordings from three facial muscle sites, researchers found
that observer facial muscle patterns mimicked those of the
person experiencing pain,247 suggesting a transfer of affective
experience from the latter to the former.
Neuroscientific research corroborates psychological data on
empathy.248 Overlapping neural correlates appear to mediate
both sharing others distress and experiencing ones own
distress.249 In fact, functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) studies indicate250 a physical overlap between
perceiving pain in another and experiencing it oneself.251 A
recent meta-analysis of thirty-two studies indicated that a core
network consisting of the anterior insula, anterior cingulate
cortex, and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) encodes the
emotional dimensions of empathy and perceptions of pain or
distress in others.252 Figure 2 includes a graphic representation
from these studies, representing the aggregated effects of 168
contrast images. Areas marked in red indicate the location of
increased activity in response to the suffering of others, while
areas in green are those involved in personal suffering and
pain, indicating significant overlap.253
247. See id.
248. See William W. Seeley et al., Dissociable Intrinsic Connectivity
Networks for Salience Processing and Executive Control, 27 J. NEUROSCIENCE
2349, 235355 (2007). See generally JAAK PANKSEPP, AFFECTIVE
NEUROSCIENCE (1998).
249. See Jamil Zaki et al., Different Circuits for Different Pain: Patterns of
Functional Connectivity Reveal Distinct Networks for Processing Pain in Self
and Others, 2 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 276, 276 (2007).
250. Admittedly, neuroimaging provides correlative, not necessarily causal,
data. Future research employing lesion or other direct interventions that
clearly modify or prevent empathy-related behaviors may further corroborate
these conclusions. See Deena Skonick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of
Neuroscience Explanations, 20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470 (2008).
251. See Philip L. Jackson et al., How Do We Perceive the Pain of Others? A
Window Into the Neural Processes Involved in Empathy, 24 NEUROIMAGE 771,
771 (2005).
252. See Claus Lamm et al., Meta-Analytic Evidence for Common and
Distinct Neural Networks Associated with Directly Experienced Pain and
Empathy for Pain, 54 NEUROIMAGE 2492, 2492 (2011).
253. Id. at 2496, 2498 fig.5.
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Figure 2.254 Neural regions implicated in experiencing pain to self
and contemplating pain felt by another. These images represent
common and distinct activations for empathy (in red) and
personally-felt pain (in green). Areas of common activation include
the anterior insula, medial and anterior cingulate cortex, precuneus,
and thalamus. Distinct activations for self-related and empathic
responses are observed in fewer regions, namely the primary
somatosensory cortex and posterior insula.
Other data indicate that observers of distress who
empathize with others do so on the basis of their own affective
experience,255 consistent with the results of Bechara et al.
above.256 Individuals expression of emotion frequently elicits
vicarious emotions such as sadness in observers.257 The process
is not a purely deliberative form of calculation, but rather some
level of affective synchrony between victim and observer is
critical for the [empathic] process to unfold.258 One study had
254. Image from id. at 2498 fig.5.
255. See Massimiliano Valeriani et al., Seeing the Pain of Others While
Being in Pain: A Laser-Evoked Potentials Study, 40 NEUROIMAGE 1419, 1419
(2008).
256. See Bechara et al., supra note 181.
257. Small & Verrochi, supra note 227, at 778.
258. Id. at 779.
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participants observe painful stimulation of another person
while suffering pain themselves.259 Results showed that the
relevant brain activity during distress corresponded
proportionally to the reported rating of ones own pain and to
that of another person.260 In fact, empathizers appeared to rely
on the vicarious intensity of shared distress or emotional pain
to judge others suffering.261 Moreover, various studies have
shown that those who have greater difficulty identifying
personal feelings and sensationsa condition known as
alexithymiahave reduced empathy.262 One study
demonstrated that as participants watched others in distress,
those with alexithymia showed less activity in brain areas
consistently implicated in pain and empathy.263 They also
showed reduced scores on empathy questionnaires compared
with control groups.264
However, empathy involves more than simply congruent
emotions and shared distress.265 It is a goal-directed process
whereby a witness seeks to reduce the distress of others.266
Recognizing this dimension of empathy is essential because
cognitive appraisal heavily influences empathy267 and is
259. See Valeriani et al., supra note 256.
260. See id. at 142527.
261. See id.
262. See Herta Guttman & Lise Laporte, Alexithymia, Empathy, and
Psychological Symptoms in a Family Context, 43 COMPREHENSIVE
PSYCHIATRY 448 (2002); Moriguchi et al., supra note 215, at 2223; M. Rastam
et al., Alexithymia in Anorexia Nervosa: A Controlled Study Using the 20-Item
Toronto Alexithymia Scale, 95 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 385 (1997).
263. SeeMoriguchi et al., supra note 215.
264. See id. at 2228.
265. See generally Jean Decety & Margarita Svetlova, Putting Together
Phylogenetic and Ontogenetic Perspectives on Empathy, 2 DEVELOPMENTAL
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1 (2012) (stating that empathy in humans is
assisted by other abstract and domain-general high-level cognitive abilities
such as executive functions, mentalizing and language, as well as the ability
to differentiate anothers mental states from ones own, which expand the
range of behaviors that can be driven by empathy).
266. Batson, supra note 231, at 412; Martin L. Hoffman, The Development
of Empathy, in ALTRUISM AND HELPING BEHAVIOR: SOCIAL, PERSONALITY,
AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES 41, 4142 (J. Philippe Rushton &
Richard M. Sorrentino eds., 1981).
267. Lamm et al., supra note 232, at 42 (indicating that accurately
assessing the reactions and circumstances of others in distress involves
cognition beyond merely feeling personal distress).
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essential to accurate empathic engagement.268 Striving to
accurately imagine how one would feel in anothers place and
correctly identifying anothers internal thoughts and feelings
are critical to genuine, helpful other-concern, particularly in
disaster response and management. A myopic or misplaced
empathy that hastily imposes false characterizations on what
victims think or feel, or that distributes heavy wool coats to
victims of disaster in Sudan and pork meals in Indonesia would
hardly be an empathy worth having.
At the same time, cognitive reappraisals may distort or
discount an initial empathic reaction, thereby reducing
altruistic feeling and motivation.269 Those who would otherwise
experience empathy might attempt to reduce their initial,
vicarious distress or other-feeling by simply discounting or
ignoring these reactions.270 They may also judge others as
members of an undeserving out-group,271 or reinterpret others
distress as resulting from their own poor choices.272 In
neuroscientific research, individuals show diminished neural
activity related to the suffering of another when the other
displays anti-social or unpleasant traits such as unfairness.273
In other words, imaging data show that cognitive judgments of
others behavior influence the affective input that contributes
to empathic feeling.
268. Tania Singer, The Neuronal Basis and Ontogeny of Empathy and
Mind Reading: Review of Literature and Implications for Future Research, 30
NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REV. 855, 860 (2006).
269. Batson, supra note 231, at 911.
270. Id.
271. See John F. Dovidio et al., Extending the Benefits of Recategorization:
Evaluations, Self-Disclosure and Helping, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
401, 40102 (1997). For instance, research indicates that when a stranger is
about to receive an electric shock, individuals led to believe that they
themselves are similar to the shock recipient report stronger physiological
stress responses than to the suffering of those recipients portrayed as
dissimilar. See Dennis Krebs, Empathy and Altruism, 32 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1134, 1134 (1975).
272. See Christian S. Crandall & Rebecca Martinez, Culture, Ideology, and
Anti-Fat Attitudes, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1165 (1996);
Wolfgang Stroebe & Margaret Stroebe, The Social Psychology of Social
Support, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 597 (E.
Tory Higgins & Arie W. Kruglanski eds., 1st ed. 1996).
273. See Tania Singer et al., Empathic Neural Responses are Modulated by
the Perceived Fairness of Others, 439 NATURE 466, 466 (2006).
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IV. THE RELATION BETWEEN EMPATHY AND
PROSOCIAL MOTIVATION
A. EMPATHYMEDIATES PROSOCIAL HELPING
Empathy would be of limited relevance to disaster research
if it did not influence prosocial behavior or decision-making. As
research indicates, empathy is a key source of prosocial
motivation aimed at improving the welfare or situation of
another in distressing circumstances.274 Although empathy is
not the sole potential contributor to altruistic behaviors,275
psychological evidence indicates that ones level of empathy
often predicts ones subsequent willingness to help others in
need, even when costly or painful.276 The level of shared
emotion felt while observing others in distress is empirically
linked to the subsequent level of willingness to help,277 and the
two correlate proportionally so that the greater the level of felt
empathy, the greater the amount of aid given.278 Experimental
evidence also indicates that shared emotional expression
increases empathy that, in turn, causes people to give more to
charity.279
Even physiological markers corroborate the link between
empathy and subsequent prosocial helping.280 Various
researchers have found that the level of brain activity specific
to empathy corresponds to subsequent willingness to provide
274. See C. Daniel Batson, The Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis: Issues and
Implications, in EMPATHY: FROM BENCH TO BEDSIDE 41, 5051 (Jean Decety
ed., 2012); Preston & de Waal, supra note 226.
275. Paul A. M. Van Lange, Does Empathy Trigger Only Altruistic
Motivation: How About Selflessness and Justice?, 8 EMOTION 766, 766 (2008).
276. See Decety & Cowell, supra note 231, at 529 (asserting that
emotional sharing [i.e.] empathic arousal or emotional contagion . . . plays a
fundamental role in generating the motivation to care and help another
individual in distress); see also Stocks et al., supra note 227; Weiner, supra
note 227.
277. See C. Daniel Batson, How Social an Animal? The Human Capacity
for Caring, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 336, 339 (1990); Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov,
The Identified Victim Effect: An Identified Group or Just a Single
Individual?, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISIONMAKING 157, 157 (2005).
278. See Batson, supra note 231.
279. See Small & Verrochi, supra note 227, at 77778.
280. See Grit Hein et al., Neural Responses to Ingroup and Outgroup
Members Suffering Predict Individual Differences in Costly Helping, 68
NEURON 149, 149 (2010).
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aid or assistance.281 In one study, individuals were scanned
while observing the suffering of others,282 and neural activity in
key regions predicted both greater subsequent empathy for
those suffering, and greater altruistic behavior.283 Another
study found that whether an individual would help someone
was predicated on the level of anterior insula activity recorded
while the observer witnessed that person experiencing harm.284
Additional neurological findings suggest that affect mediates
the connection between identifying individuals in need and
demonstrating willingness to help them.285 Specifically, only
increased activity in brain regions linked to affect and
motivation statistically account for increased donations later.286
These and other studies287 provide tangible evidence that
empathy is a neurobiologically-mediated class of emotion
associated with shared distress that correlates with subsequent
prosocial helping. Thus, altering the amount of empathy one
feels subsequently changes ones willingness to help. But just
as empathy is influenced by cognitive appraisals and is
susceptible to callousness and indifference, so too is prosocial
helping.288 In fact, recent psychological and neurological
studies indicate that exceptional displays of altruism lie on a
spectrum opposite extreme apathy to the needs and feelings of
othersas characterized by psychopathy and related mental
disorders.289 Anatomical differences in neural activity and
281. See id.; Carrie L. Masten et al., An fMRI Investigation of Empathy For
Social Pain and Subsequent Prosocial Behavior, 55 NEUROIMAGE 381, 381
(2011); Andreas Olsson & Kevin N. Ochsner, The Role of Social Cognition in
Emotion, 12 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 65, 65 (2008).
282. See Vani A. Mathur et al., Neural Basis of Extraordinary Empathy
and Altruistic Motivation, 51 NEUROIMAGE 1468, 146970 (2010).
283. See id. at 147072.
284. See Hein et al., supra note 281.
285. See Alexander Genevsky et al., Neural Underpinnings of the
Identifiable Victim Effect: Affect Shifts Preferences for Giving, 33 J.
NEUROSCIENCE 17188, 1719495 (2013).
286. See id.
287. See, e.g., Jorge A. Barraza & Paul J. Zak, Values, Empathy and
Fairness Across Social Barriers, 1167 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 182 (2009).
288. See Simon Baron-Cohen & Sally Wheelwright, The Empathy Quotient:
An Investigation of Adults with Asperger Syndrome or High Functioning
Autism, and Normal Sex Differences, 34 J. AUTISM DEVELOPMENTAL
DISORDERS 163 (2004).
289. See Dustin A. Pardini et al., Lower Amygdala Volume in Men is
Associated with Childhood Aggression, Early Psychopathic Traits, and Future
Violence, 75 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 73, 73 (2014); Jennifer L. Skeem et al.,
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volume of the amygdalaa brain region consistently linked to
processing emotion and social awarenessappear to largely
mediate the differences in extreme calloused, as opposed to
altruistic, behavior.290
In addition, generally the more one identifies with a
specific person and her suffering, the greater ones subsequent
empathy and altruistic motivation.291 More fully including
another person in ones own self-conception or more favorably
evaluating another correlates with increased prosocial
giving.292 To illustrate, neuroscientists used fMRI scans to
observe individuals reactions to the distress of others.293 They
found that an area consistently linked to empathythe
MPFCshowed activity related to subsequent willingness to
help the victims.294 Such information is important because
other studies connect the MPFC to cognitive appraisal of
others identity, social proximity, and personal
characteristics.295 Therefore, potential empathic responses and
prosocial behavior appear to be influenced by cognitive
assessments of situational and identity-based characteristics.
Psychopathic Personality: Bridging the Gap Between Scientific Evidence and
Public Policy, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 95, 9596 (2011); Yaling Yang et al.,
Localization of Deformations Within the Amygdala in Individuals with
Psychopathy, 66 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 986, 986 (2009).
290. See Abigail A. Marsh et al., Neural and Cognitive Characteristics of
Extraordinary Altruists, 111 PROC. NATL ACAD. SCI. 15036, 15036 (2014);
Yang et al., supra note 290.
291. See generally Arthur Aron et al., Self-Expansion Model of Motivation
and Cognition in Close Relationships, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CLOSE
RELATIONSHIPS 91, 91111 (Jeffry Simpson and Lorne Campbell eds., 2013).
292. See C. Daniel Batson et al., An Additional Antecedent of Empathic
Concern: Valuing the Welfare of the Person in Need, 93 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 65, 65 (2007).
293. SeeMathur et al., supra note 283.
294. See id.
295. See Claus Lamm et al., What are You Feeling? Using Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging to Assess the Modulation of Sensory and Affective
Responses During Empathy for Pain, 2 PLOS ONE, Dec. 2007 (e1292), at 1,
1012; Steven M. Platek & Shelly M. Kemp, Is Family Special to the Brain?
An Event-Related fMRI Study of Familiar, Familial, and Self-Face
Recognition, 47 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 849 (2009); Kai Vogeley & Gerion R.
Fink, Neural Correlates of the First-Person-Perspective, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE
SCI. 38 (2003).
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B. INDIFFERENCE, DISTORTION, AND THE FRAGILE LINK
BETWEEN EMPATHY AND PROSOCIALMOTIVATION
Empathy and altruistic motivation are vulnerable to
potentially enervating influences.296 Empathy and prosocial
motivation are thus patterns to foster rather than merely take
for granted.297 Witnessing or hearing about flooding, injury,
and destruction will not necessarily elicit a robust empathic
response among observers, leaders, or the general public.298
Perceptions of need and identification with victims significantly
impact empathic responses to the plight or potential harm
faced by others.299 These factors thereby impact the extent to
which individuals are willing to take action to prevent disaster
susceptibilities or to ameliorate the destruction once disasters
occur.300 More specifically, key determinants and potentially
distorting influences promote or subvert genuine empathic and
prosocial responses. Ensuring optimal disaster outcomes will
296. See Decety & Cowell, supra note 231, at 529 (asserting that human
research shows that many variables affect its induction in an observer); see
also Stephan Dickert & Paul Slovic, Attentional Mechanisms in the Generation
of Sympathy, 4 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 297, 297 (2009); Preston & de
Waal, supra note 226, at 1.
297. In so doing, one must nonetheless recognize limits in such
malleability, as some of the individual differences in altruistic dispositions
appear to be genetically-based. See J. Philippe Rushton et al., Altruism and
Aggression: The Heritability of Individual Differences, 50 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1192, 1192 (1986); Graham J. Thompson et al., Genes
Underlying Altruism, 9 BIOLOGICAL LETTERS 1, 16 (2013).
298. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, BEHAVIOR AND ATTITUDES
UNDER CRISIS CONDITIONS: SELECTED ISSUES AND FINDINGS 7792, 12780
(1984) (identifying how the public responds to potential crises asymmetrically,
depending on familiarity with the type of crises); Michael J. Hogan et al.,
Campaign Contributions, Lobbying, and Post-Katrina Contracts, 34
DISASTERS 593 (2010) (documenting the relationship between campaign
contributions to politicians and decisions responding to potential disaster
events); Michele Landis Dauber, The Real Third Rail of American Politics, in
CATASTROPHE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE HUMANITARIAN IMPULSE 60, 6477
(Austin Sarat & Javier Lezaun eds., 2009) (characterizing motivation for
disaster response as a product of framing rather than of total need); Susan M.
Sterett, Need and Citizenship After Disaster, 13 NAT. HAZARDS REV. 233
(2012) (discussing concepts of citizenship, migration, and refugee status
among people displaced by Hurricane Katrina and humanitarian responses
based on these concepts).
299. See MICHAEL DAWSON ET AL., UNIV. OF CHI., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF
RACE POLITICS AND CULTURE, 2005 RACIAL ATTITUDES AND THE KATRINA
DISASTER STUDY 5 (2006).
300. See generally OLASKY, supra note 163.
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require recognizing these factors in broader assessments of
disaster and response.
First, the intensity of experienced emotion influences the
level of empathic response.301 Research suggests that
individuals feel greater empathy for sudden, intense pain
rather than chronic pain.302 Moreover, focusing on the tragic or
painful aspects of anothers situation strengthens shared
feeling.303 When the pain of others is made salient, neural
activation associated with distress and empathy increases.304
Conversely, when factors distract an observer from the
intensity of suffering, poignancy, or initial shock of an event,
the observer is less likely to share the distress of the
sufferer.305 As such, in communicating or framing disasters,
efforts that minimize the sense of immediate impact or dilute
the urgency or shock of a situation may diminish empathic
responses.
A second factor includes the empathy targets and their
features. Negative perceptions of others can affect empathic
reactions.306 For instance, individuals show diminished neural
activity in regions mediating empathy when they observe
people suffering whom they deem to be immoral or unfair.307
Similarly, observers exhibit far less empathy when viewing
those suffer who appear to have willfully brought the
conditions of suffering upon themselves.308 Neuroscientific
findings authenticate these conclusions: observers show greater
neural activation in brain areas associated with distress when
301. See Karen Gasper & Gerald L. Clore, The Persistent Use of Negative
Affect by Anxious Individuals to Estimate Risk, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1350, 1350 (1998).
302. See Alexander Otti, I Know the Pain You FeelHow the Human
Brains Default Mode Predicts Our Resonance to Anothers Suffering, 169
NEUROSCIENCE 143, 14546 (2010); Milamaaria Saarela, The Compassionate
Brain: Humans Detect Intensity of Pain from Anothers Face, 17 CEREBRAL
CORTEX 230, 230 (2007).
303. See Chantal Villemure & M. Catherine Bushnell, Cognitive
Modulation of Pain: How Do Attention and Emotion Influence Pain
Processing?, 95 PAIN 195, 195 (2002).
304. See Xiaosi Gu & Shihui Han, Attention and Reality Constraints on the
Neural Processes of Empathy for Pain, 36 NEUROIMAGE 256, 258 (2007).
305. See Dickert & Slovic, supra note 297, at 30203.
306. See Singer et al., supra note 274.
307. See id.
308. See Crandall & Martinez, supra note 273, at 116974.
48 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 17:1
viewing individuals suffer who were deemed not responsible for
their circumstance.309
Third, empathic responses are highly sensitive to
appraisals of context. Experiencing or even interpreting a
physical event as regular, systemic, and normal as opposed to
random and overwhelming can reduce affective, empathic
feeling.310 Individuals become easily desensitized when viewing
events as routine,311 potentially weakening the link between
shared distress and prosocial response.312 By extension,
characterizing disasters less as acts of God that are
unforeseeable, and more as systemic events that reveal societal
preferences may imply regularity, thereby diminishing the
distressing dimensions of disaster. Thus, attempts to
systematize disaster framing in a way that emphasizes the
futility, randomness, and senselessness of the disaster could
actually heighten empathy towards victims, whereas
conceptualizations of disasters as normal are likely to
undermine it.
Fourth, perceived closeness or identification with a victim
increases empathy and prosocial helping, while social distance
undermines them. Watching pictures of actual people as
opposed to images of cartoons being harmed induces greater
neural distress activity in observers.313 Additionally, behavioral
and neural measures demonstrate that perspective-taking can
alter individuals empathic response.314 In one set of tests,
researchers asked subjects to contemplate either the victims
situation or feelings.315 These activities served to increase the
309. See Jean Decety et al., The Blame Game: The Effect of Responsibility
and Social Stigma on Empathy for Pain, 22 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 985,
985 (2010).
310. See Paul M. Robins et al., The Experience of Secondary Traumatic
Stress Upon Care Providers Working Within a Childrens Hospital, 24 J.
PEDIATRIC NURSING 270, 270 (2009).
311. See Kelly R. Chrestman, Secondary Exposure to Trauma and Self
Reported Distress Among Therapists, in SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS: SELF-
CARE ISSUES FOR CLINICIANS, RESEARCHERS, AND EDUCATORS 29, 2935 (B.
Hudnall Stamm ed., 1995); Charles R. Figley, Compassion Fatigue as
Secondary Traumatic Stress Disorder: An Overview, in COMPASSION FATIGUE:
COPING WITH SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 1, 112 (Charles R.
Figley ed., 1995).
312. See Valeriani et al., supra note 256.
313. See Gu & Han, supra note 305, at 265.
314. See Lamm et al., supra note 232.
315. Gu & Han, supra note 305, at 258.
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empathic responses as reflected in subsequent behavior as well
as neural activity.316 By extension, data shows that observers
are more likely to feel empathy when they are able to imagine
the victim,317 and perceive the suffering of a few rather than
many.318 Identifying a particular individual who suffers, for
example, elicits stronger affective reactions than statistics
about them tend to do.319 Conversely, when numerical data
serve to increase temporal and spatial distance between
empathizer and victim,320 generalized empathy diminishes.321
Individuals also tend to help identifiable victims more
frequently and with greater urgency than statistical victims.322
Therefore, while expanding models of vulnerability in terms of
statistics rather than persons or experiences may more easily
facilitate calculation and decision-making in the abstract, such
representations run the risk of dissipating the key emotive
elements of disaster need and risk.323
C. POTENTIAL CONCERNS
The present case assumes that empathy is a noble ideal
and essential for prosocial decision-making and other-concern.
Although most take such a view as given,324 a few critics have
been less sympathetic. For instance, some have claimed that
empathy is overly sentimental and is an impediment to
effective policy.325 In other words, compassion and empathy
316. Id.
317. See generally MARK H. DAVIS, EMPATHY: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
APPROACH (1994) (discussing the history of various theories of empathy).
318. See Karen E. Jenni & George F. Loewenstein, Explaining the
Identifiable Victim Effect, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 235, 236 (1997); George
F. Loewenstein & Deborah A. Small, The Scarecrow and the Tin Man: The
Vicissitudes of Human Sympathy and Caring, 11 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 112,
118 (2007).
319. See Loewenstein & Small, supra note 319, at 118.
320. See id. at 116.
321. See id.
322. See Deborah A. Small & George F. Loewenstein, Helping the Victim or
Helping a Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5,
514 (2003).
323. See Chen, supra note 14, at 1143 (acknowledging the difficulty in
reconciling a highly rational and formal analogy, in this case financial
portfolio theory, with the asymmetrical, horribly inelegant distribution of
risk in disasters).
324. Bloom, supra note 203 (explaining that the view that empathy is a
cure for humanitys ills befits the spirit of the times).
325. Id.; Isaacson, supra note 203.
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provoked by compelling pictures may be a suitable basis for
Christmas charity drives, but are poor bases for humanitarian
policy.326 Others have suggested that empathy is biased and
burdensome,327 perhaps to the point of pathology.328 They are
wont to point to the considerable efforts to help during 9/11 and
the Sandy Hook massacre as compared to the inadequate
efforts made for equally tragic but less sensational disasters
such as heat waves.329
Although the consequences of these criticisms are serious,
the broader arguments they invoke appear misplaced or
exaggerated. First, as defined above, empathy occurs when one
successfully understands the thoughts and feelings of others,
shares emotions such as distress, and identifies with anothers
plight or condition.330 Amidst the obstructive thoughts and
emotions that can trump effective empathic response, empathy
is more a constellation of effortful aims that rely on
perspective-sharing, social competence, and executive control331
than a guaranteed response to suffering. In other words, it is
only when individuals at least partially come to identify with
and feel for those who suffer that we consider empathy to have
taken place.332 As such, criticisms involving humanitarian
shortcomings or in-group biases are less instances of empathys
failure, and more instances of failures to empathize.
Nor do concerns about empathic excess or thoughtlessness
appear entirely warranted. First, the notion that any virtue can
be taken to extremes is nothing new. For millennia,
philosophers, theologians, and others have warned of the
326. Isaacson, supra note 203.
327. Bloom, supra note 203.
328. Antonia J.Z. Henderson et al., The Living Anonymous Kidney Donor:
Lunatic or Saint?, 3 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 203, 208 (2003).
329. I am grateful to Daniel Farber for this point. See also Bloom, supra
note 203; James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., The Legal Framework for Meeting Surge
Capacity Through the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Public
Health Emergencies and Other Disasters, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY
5, 9 & n.21 (2005) (citing Judith Faust, Address before the Emergency System
for Advance Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals Focus Group
Meeting: Volunteer Surge During 9/11 in New York (August 11, 2005)).
330. See Aron et al., supra note 292 (arguing that the more one identifies
with another individual, the more he or she possesses empathy).
331. See Lamm et al., supra note 232; Underwood & Moore, supra note
232.
332. See BATSON, supra note 227, at 31; de Waal, supra note 226;
HOFFMAN, supra note 226, at 29; Preston & de Waal, supra note 226.
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potential excesses of even the most virtuous behaviors.333 Just
as it would be unfair to denounce courage tout court for
instances of brazen recklessness, so too would it be unfair to
censure empathy itself for instances of misguided or
thoughtless liberality. Extreme empathic and altruistic
behavior exists along a distributed spectrum opposite extreme
callousness, and a few outlying instances of the former should
not mar the status of the emotion or virtue generally.334
Second, excessive empathy and giving are simply not top
concerns shared by actual disaster organizations and victims
around the world. Indeed, as global aid institutions can attest,
the central challenge in most disasters is not too much
munificence or empathic concern.335 Not only are voluntary and
non-governmental resources essential in many disasters,336 but
according to the International Federation of the Red Cross, in
countless disaster settings the primary problem with
international relief is not that there is too much of it for
domestic regulatory systems to handle, but rather that there is
too little.337
On balance, then, acknowledging potential flaws or
limitations of even the more noble ideals such as empathic
feeling and accuracy is fruitful for critical discussion and
policy-making.338 However, disparaging them altogether or
suggesting that they are irrelevant to disaster efforts and
policies appears misguided. Empathy is more than random
bursts of compassion; it is a foundational set of skills and social
behaviors for acting on behalf of others.339 Some critical
333. See 2 THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt I-II, q. 64 art. 14
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classic 1981) (c.
1274); ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. II at 2930 (Leslie Brown ed.,
David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (c. 384 B.C.E.); Theresa Derlan
Yeh, The Way to Peace: A Buddhist Perspective, 11 INTL J. PEACE STUD. 91,
9697 (2006).
334. SeeMarsh et al., supra note 291, at 15036.
335. See INTL FEDN OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, LAW AND
LEGAL ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE: A DESK STUDY-
SUMMARY VERSION 16 (2007) [hereinafter, RED CROSS, LEGAL ISSUES].
336. See U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-712, HURRICANES
KATRINA AND RITA: COORDINATION BETWEEN FEMA AND THE RED CROSS
SHOULD BE IMPROVED FOR THE 2006 HURRICANE SEASON 17 (2006)
[hereinafter GAO, HURRICANES] (noting that both government agencies and
private organizations were overwhelmed after Hurricane Katrina).
337. RED CROSS, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 336, at 16.
338. See Bloom, supra, note 203.
339. See Batson, supra note 231; Decety & Cowell, supra note 231, at 529.
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analyses may thus suffer an availability bias by focusing
inordinately on extreme and highly-publicized instances of
empathy instead of the less sensational but far more common
daily examples of sacrifice extended at local blood banks,
hospitals, or disaster relief centers in times of disasters large
and small.340 As such, deprecating the significance and
usefulness of empathy gives short shrift to a central dimension
of prosocial behavior and disaster relief.341 Moreover, because
empathy and prosocial behavior generally are susceptible to
cognitive appraisal and judgment, tarnishing or disregarding
empathy and prosocial action may encourage academics, policy-
makers, and citizens to disregard an essential motivator and
facilitator of effective disaster management.
V. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH APPLIED TO PRACTICE
Scientific research on empathy and prosocial behavior, and
its relationship to systematization, applies directly to specific
concerns involving disaster planning and response. Specifically,
systematizing disaster may distort experts and authorities
decision-making, and render it less responsive to the needs of
communities and individuals.342 It may also diminish the
publics political willingness to demand adequate government
responses to crises, to volunteer, or to donate public resources
on behalf of victims.343 Finally, the methods used to frame
disaster may distort behavior in response to human
calamity.344
340. See Danshera Cords, Charitable Contributions for Disaster Relief:
Rationalizing Tax Consequences and Victim Benefits, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 427,
432 (2008); Adam F. Simon, Television News and International Earthquake
Relief, J. COMM., Sept. 1997, at 82, 91.
341. See GAO, HURRICANES, supra note 337, at 17 (indicating the extent to
which government agencies and private organizations are often overwhelmed
after major disasters); C. Daniel Batson et al., Information Function of
Empathic Emotion: Learning That We Value the Others Welfare, 68 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 300, 312 (1995) (explaining that a lack of
empathy can lead to devaluing of other individuals); see also Cords, supra note
341, at 42829.
342. Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1131, 1173 (2011).
343. Amy J.C. Cuddy et al., Aid in the Aftermath of Hurricane Katrina:
Inferences of Secondary Emotions and Intergroup Helping, 10 GROUP
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 107, 10708 (2007).
344. See generally DAWSON ET AL., supra note 300 (discussing the medias
attempts to frame Hurricane Katrina).
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A. DONATIONS AND POLITICALWILL
Adequate resources and political involvement are essential
to disaster prevention, compensation, and response. Donors at
international, national, state, and local levels play a
foundational role furnishing monetary and other resources to
directly assist victims, and provide food, shelter, and medical
supplies. Citizens and voters also play a crucial role ensuring
that adequate government disaster responses are forthcoming.
Where these individuals are unwilling to place political
pressure on leaders, victims of disaster are more likely to
suffer. Moreover, insufficient humanitarian resources and aid
workers are frequently cited as prime concerns.345 In fact, a
central challenge in many disasters is inadequate contributions
and material resources.346
Despite the importance of public donations and political
will, the motivations underlying these forces may vacillate.
Consistent with the research above, when media or scholars
portray victims of disaster as lawless or antisocial, would-be-
donors and otherwise sympathetic citizens are less likely to
donate or place pressure on elected officials to act on behalf of
victims.347 With regard to Katrina, many observers of state and
federal action considered the general response tepid at various
levels.348 Lack of strong political will and fear of crime and
lawlessness in the area hampered response
efforts . . . resulting in delays in search and rescue, provision of
medical care, restoration of critical infrastructure, and delivery
of desperately needed food, water, and sanitary supplies.349
More consequential still, cognitive deliberations and
framing disaster in numerical or abstract terms may easily
distort or weaken individuals willingness to help. Generosity to
those in need is reduced when information is introduced in the
345. IFRC &UNDP, supra note 88, at 36.
346. Id. at 57.
347. Amidst reports of violence and looting among victims of Katrina,
many citizens took up arms to protect themselves against these victims. See
John Burnett, Evacuees Were Turned Away at Gretna, L.A., NPR MORNING
EDITION (Sept. 20, 2005), http://www.npr.org/templates
/story/story.php?storyId=4855611; see also Singer et al., supra note 274, at 466
(reporting research that indicates empathy in males is modulated by the
perceived fairness of the other persons behavior).
348. See SENATE COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC., supra note 23, at 4.
349. Sun, supra note 343.
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form of statistics.350 When researchers require potential donors
to rationally consider statistical rather than poignant
information regarding need, donors prosocial motivation tends
to decline.351 In one study, donors actually gave less to
identified victims after interventions that required considering
statistical information and yet gave no more to statistical
victims.352 In other words, these interventions rendered donors
more informed but far less generous.
These effects are connected to research indicating that
when individuals begin to conceive of loss and harm in terms of
large numbers or quantified data, they experience a
psychophysical numbing of sorts.353 For instance, individuals
appear to show less affective empathy for many victims as
opposed to a few or one.354 When individuals imagine a single
person, they tend to impute greater agency and personhood to
her than when they consider her en masse or as a statistic; they
also tend to value her life more than when aggregated in
masses.355 At the same time, people are far more generous to
identifiable victims than to those depicted abstractly, even if
the need of those abstractly represented is far greater.356 In
addition, donations to an actual person tend to be higher than
those made on behalf of groups or statistical victims.357
Conversely, experiments that encourage donors to process
350. See Deborah A. Small et al., Sympathy and Callousness: The Impact of
Deliberative Thought on Donations to Identifiable and Statistical Victims, 102
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 143, 146 (2007).
351. See Fritz Strack & Roland Deutsch, Reflective and Impulsive
Determinants of Social Behavior, 8 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 220,
223 (2004).
352. See Small et al., supra note 351, at 150.
353. David Featherstonhaugh et al., Insensitivity to the Value of Human
Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 282, 284
(1997).
354. Daniel Vastfjall et al., Compassion Fade: Affect and Charity Are
Greatest for a Single Child in Need, 9 PLOS ONE, June 2014 (e100115), at 1,
2.
355. See James Friedrich et al., Psychophysical Numbing: When Lives Are
Valued Less as the Lives at Risk Increase, 8 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 277, 278
(1999).
356. See Gary Charness & Uri Gneezy, Whats in a Name? Anonymity and
Social Distance in Dictator and Ultimatum Games, 68 J. ECON. BEHAV. &
ORG. 29, 33 (2008); Kogut & Ritov, supra note 278, at 158.
357. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 278, at 164.
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information emotively augment both affective responses and
donation amounts.358
An underlying element in these findings is the role of
maintaining emotionally-salient connections to isolated or
abstract persons and conditions.359 Specifically,
[i]n order to mentally transform the suffering of others into a
coherent and meaningful representation, it is often necessary to
focus on the specific features of those in need. In situations where
selective attention to these features is reduced or not possible,
mental images do not generate emotions that motivate helping.360
Inasmuch as systematization involves aggregating loss, death,
or harm in the form of group statistics or mass figures, the
devastation is less likely to elicit empathy, giving, and political
will to help,361 with obvious ramifications for efforts to manage
and respond to disaster.
Finally, given the influence of interpretations of moral
character and culpability on empathic and altruistic behavior,
efforts to curb disaster aid corruption may also be particularly
consequential. Violations of trust, misuse of others funds, and
corruption evoke a wide range of negative emotions that
significantly diminish individuals concern for would-be aid
recipients.362 Individuals consistently reduce their generosity
358. See Small et al., supra note 351, at 150.
359. See Paul Slovic & Daniel Vastfjall, Affect, Moral Intuition, and Risk,
21 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 387, 395 (2010) (stating that one way to increase
empathy towards large groups of people is to make them real through the
use of personal narratives or an image of a face).
360. Stephen Dickert et al., Valuations of Human Lives: Normative
Expectations and Psychological Mechanisms of (Ir)rationality, 189 SYNTHESE
(SUPP. 1) 95, 101 (2012).
361. Although important differences exist between explicitly man-made
disasters, such as war, and other natural disasters, historical evidence
indicates that the power of feeling anothers tragedy in single, visceral
portrayals can significantly inform public opinion. In either case, emotive
images have often been found to have a more visceral effect on public opinion
than statistical depictions of comparable harm. See JONATHAN GLOVER,
HUMANITY: A MORAL HISTORY OF THE 20TH CENTURY 16576 (2000)
(comparing divergent narratives and realities in the experience and news
coverage of wars).
362. See SAMIA COSTA TAVARES, ROCHESTER INST. OF TECH., DO MORE
CORRUPT COUNTRIES RECEIVE LESS DISASTER RELIEF? (2008) (concluding that
U.S. disaster aid response and amount may be affected by perceived
corruption of the country needing aid); Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk, Trust, and
Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 675 (1993); Wolfgang Steinel & Carsten K. W.
De Dreu, Social Motives and Strategic Misrepresentation in Social Decision
Making, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 419, 431 (2004); Karen W.
Arenson, Ex-United Way Leader Gets 7 Years for Embezzlement, N.Y. TIMES,
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after their trust is violated.363 As such, attempts to legally
target humanitarian aid corruption may bolster empathy by
ensuring effective delivery of aid without exploiting donors
good will. Prosecuting corrupt government officials, aid
workers, and related personnel for intentional
misappropriation, willful neglect, or abuse of authority may
diminish violations of trust and prevent reductions in giving.364
In this way, lawmakers in the United States and abroad can
incorporate an understanding of the relationship between
ethical behavior, empathy, and generosity into practical legal
reform.
B. COMMUNITY VOLUNTEERS
Empathy is equally crucial for basic motivations to serve
ones community in times of crisis. The tragic effects of
hurricanes, floods, heat waves, and wildfires require
substantial labor to save lives and property. Damaged
infrastructure, broken levies, ruptured pipelines, and breached
reactor containers often overwhelm responder capacity.365 More
immediately, vital public services may have been compromised.
People may be trapped under collapsed roads, bridges, or
buildings, left homeless, or in need of food, water, and medical
care. Where local capacity is overwhelmed, organizations and
emergency response teams may require thousands of
volunteers, physicians, medical technicians, engineers, and
psychologists.366 Although professional rescue teams fulfill
June 23, 1995, at A14; Mark Tran & Liz Ford, UK Suspends Aid to Uganda as
Concern Grows over Misuse of Funds, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 16, 2012; Peter
Whoriskey & Jacqueline L. Salmon, Charity Concealed Pilfering: Auditors
Had Flagged United Way Executive, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE (Ind.), Aug. 17,
2003, at 7A.
363. See Terry L. Boles et al., Deception and Retribution in Repeated
Ultimatum Bargaining, 83 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 235,
253 (2000); Slovic, supra note 363.
364. See TAVARES, supra note 363.
365. See VERCHICK, supra note 11, at 13135.
366. See Christopher T. Born & William G. DeLong, Jr., Organizing the
Orthopaedic Trauma Association Mass Casualty Response Team, 422
CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 114, 114 (2004); James G. Hodge,
Jr. et al., Volunteer Health Professionals and Emergencies: Assessing and
Transforming the Legal Environment, 3 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 216,
217 (2005).
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significant response duties, philanthropic efforts and volunteer
work remain indispensable.367
Yet, motivation and willingness to perform these vital
functions is never guaranteed. As one set of observers noted,
perhaps the most shocking development in the aftermath of
the Hurricane Katrina disaster was the sluggish and
inadequate response to victims who were clearly in dire need of
assistance.368 Specifically, in the aftermath of Katrina,
researchers investigated the influence of feeling empathy and
identifying the emotions of others on individuals willingness to
help victims.369 They discovered that when members of one
racial group inferred significantly lower secondary emotions to
other racial groups, their willingness to help them after a
disaster plummeted.370 According to the researchers, by
attributing fewer secondary emotions to out-groups, the
observers effectively denied others a human essence, which
they reserve for the in-group, thereby subverting their
willingness to help.371 Conversely, having individuals take the
perspective of out-group members has been shown to diminish
negative judgments or stereotypes.372
A particularly salient area in which empathy plays a vital
role in volunteering is helping individuals to cope with trauma
related to disaster. Disasters are often highly disturbing events
that can induce anxiety and depression in victims and
observers. Such groups are more vulnerable to mental
disorder.373 Volunteers can offer psychological comfort,374 help
367. See Fang Tian et al., Psychological and Behavioural Impacts of the
2008 China Earthquake on Blood Donors, 99 VOX SANGUINIS 142, 147 (2010)
(reporting increased voluntary blood donation after a Chinese earthquake, and
assessing stated motivations).
368. Cuddy et al., supra note 344.
369. Id. at 110.
370. Id. at 113.
371. According to the study, Black/Latino participants inferred lower
secondary emotions about the White victim than about the Black victim
[while] White participants inferences of secondary emotions about Black and
White victims differed in the predicted direction but this difference was not
significant. Cuddy et al., supra note 344, at 11012.
372. See Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 233.
373. See Ben-Zur & Zeidner, supra note 219; David Vlahov et al., Sustained
Increased Consumption of Cigarettes, Alcohol, and Marijuana Among
Manhattan Residents After September 11, 2001, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 253,
253 (2004) (discussing increased drug usage in post-9/11 Manhattan); David
Vlahov et al., Increased Use of Cigarettes, Alcohol, and Marijuana Among
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individuals regain mental functioning, and mitigate the onset
of psychiatric illness.375 They may also provide compassion and
emotional support, or teach resilience376 through personal
conversation or public discussion.377
Discrediting empathy as a valid response to disaster, or
creating legal-based norms that encourage citizens to treat
disaster relief as a government, not personal, task may also
diminish vital informal disaster efforts. Indeed, informal social
capital and interpersonal empathy can save lives. For instance,
during one particularly dangerous heat wave in Chicago that
killed hundreds,378 groups deemed to have stronger intra-
community ties experienced lower death rates.379 Disaster
mortality rates diverged noticeably even among groups that
shared comparable levels of poverty.380 In particular, although
Latinos overall level of poverty placed them at a heightened
risk of mortality, they experienced a surprisingly low death
rate,381 a fact subsequently attributed to favorable social
network norms.382 In developing plans and disaster responses,
addressing these types of personal dynamics is paramount.
From a less sanguine perspective, volunteers too are
amenable to psychophysical numbing and other factors, such as
perceptions of need, identification with disaster victims, and
determinations of the in-group or out-group status of victims.383
Various types of systematization are likely to play out where
dehumanizing portrayals are made of disaster conditions or
victims: when the pain of others is made particularly salient to
Manhattan, New York Residents After the September 11th Terrorist Attacks,
155 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 988, 988 (2002).
374. See Gilbert Reyes & Jon D. Elhai, Psychosocial Interventions in the
Early Phases of Disasters, 41 PSYCHOTHERAPY 399, 408 (2004).
375. See generally Jodi Halpern, What is Clinical Empathy?, 18 J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. 670 (2003) (explaining the use of empathy by physicians to
lower patient anxiety and provide more effective care).
376. See Reyes & Elhai, supra note 375, at 410.
377. See Gary A. Kreps, Sociological Inquiry and Disaster Research, 10
ANN. REV. SOC. 309, 318 (1984).
378. ERIC KLINENBERG, HEATWAVE 9 (2002).
379. See id. at 10528.
380. Id. at 19.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 35.
383. See generally DAWSON ET AL., supra note 300 (discussing the racial
gap, media framing, and Katrina victims opinions on the cause of the
hurricane).
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the public, empathy and eagerness to help tend to increase.384
Conversely, when portrayalswhether in media, public
disseminations, broadcasts, or community dialoguedistract
an observer or neglect to communicate the intensity of
suffering, emotional significance, or initial shock of an event,
citizens are less likely to share or appropriate the distress of
the sufferer.385
Perhaps more injurious to the willingness to help is the
prospect of potential penalties for volunteering. Today,
volunteers can in some cases be held criminally or civilly liable
for actions taken in an emergency situation.386 For instance,
medical volunteers can be held liable for medical procedures
performed without informed consent, or for negligent infliction
of emotional distress if their actions caused substantial
emotional suffering and the victims reaction was
foreseeable.387 Fear of serious legal repercussions for
unintended consequences could easily diminish potential
volunteers willingness to help by making already costly,
uncompensated behavior even less appealing. As such,
reasonably restricting the extent to which possible liability may
attach to good faith efforts may ensure robust volunteering.
Although Congress has addressed aspects of this concern,388
liability issues remain. For instance, states retain broad
authority to opt out of legislation, immunity extends to
volunteers not organizations, and government and nonprofits
may sue individual volunteers.389 More comprehensive,
prospective coverage in all states could reduce concerns and
foster greater willingness to participate in disaster relief
efforts.
384. See Gu & Han, supra note 305, at 265; Simon, supra note 341.
385. See Dickert & Slovic, supra note 297, at 304; Simon, supra note 341.
386. See DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR
ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS, LEGAL AND
REGULATORY ISSUES REPORT 62 (2005).
387. Id.
388. Such limited liability holds only so long as the volunteer is working
within the scope of her responsibilities, is appropriately licensed or certified,
and does not cause willful or grossly negligent harm. See Volunteer Protection
Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450114503 (2012).
389. See id.
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C. ELITE AND EXPERT DISASTERMANAGEMENT
Lawmakers, engineers, economists, biohazard technicians,
and other authorities are not immune to potential bias and
distortion, or the prominent role of affect in their decision-
making. In particular, authorities and experts retaining a
robust sense of empathy and human connection with disaster
and its victims is essential. As Kenneth Feinberg,
administrator of the BP Oil Spill and other disaster funds, has
admonished authorities: never underestimate the effect of
empathizing with and listening to the victims of disaster.390
When decision-makers pursue systematic reforms without
consideration of the broader human and empathic dimensions
of disaster, their own framework may blind them to their
biases and errors. As the state definitions suggest, the policies
governing disaster declaration and relief efforts offer extensive
opportunities for subjective judgment.391 Equivalent license
exists in determining what constitutes problems too large in
scope or unusual in type,392 and in defining what entails
widespread or severe damage.393 Similarly, the benchmarks
that authorities select significantly influence how genuine need
and successful disaster relief are measured.394 Authorities may
also decide the extent to which a community can participate in
decision-making and what issues are barred from public
discussion.
The potential for abuse of power might suggest that more
formalistic mechanisms will eliminate such concerns by
generating decisions arrived at without regard to persons and
in purely procedural manner.395 However, formalistic efforts
390. Kathleen Hennessey, Overseer of Gulf Victim Fund a Force of Nature,
L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at A15. Although initially perceived as cool and
aloof among victims, Feinberg changed tacks and was largely praised for his
empathy and willingness to listen to hundreds of victims stories, which
significantly facilitated resolving highly complex, emotionally-charged issues.
See Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450114503 (2012).
391. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 28-1 (West 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. §
414.0335 (2015).
392. N.J. STAT. ANN. § App. A:9-33.1 (West 2006); see also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 58-2-101 (2013).
393. IND. CODE § 10-14-3-1(a) (2005); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 20, 2(a) (McKinney
2004); TEX GOVT CODE ANN. § 418.004 (West 2012).
394. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 92; Fothergill, supra note 7, at 3435;
Landis, supra note 6, at 971; Pulido, supra note 7, at 12.
395. See Kalberg, supra note 83, at 1158; WEBER, ECONOMY supra note 82,
at 65657.
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are no guarantee of efficiency and impartiality. Not only did
excessive legal details and disputes contribute to the delayed
response to Katrina,396 but also numbers and objective
protocols can deceive authorities of their own biases, even
within standardized frameworks. For instance, Slovic et al.
tested elites and experts on judgments of risk.397 They were
asked to assess the risk of exposure to varying chemicals, such
as benzene, cigarette smoke, and dioxins in food, and then to
judge the degree of risk associated with minimal exposure
defined as less than 1/100th the exposure level relevant to a
regulatory agency.398 Because exposure was so low for every
hazard, risk judgments should have rationally been uniform
and low; yet, almost every respondent rated significantly
higher those chemicals more negatively rated in terms of
affect.399 Although one could conjecture that the study proves
that numbers are, in fact, the solution, the studys deeper
meaning implies that any rigid distinction between expert
judgment relying on affect but discoursing in numbers, and
expert judgment derived purely from numbers, is tenuous.
If systematic frameworks of disaster response are
instruments of value and preference, then whether those
preferences and assessments demonstrate empathy and show
genuine concern for all is significant. For example, genuine
empathy may encourage authorities to do more for victims than
legal reforms or codes require, or legal constraints might
otherwise allow. For instance, in the past, U.S. legislators have
disregarded potential constitutional limits for providing
disaster relief in deference to appeals to empathy, charity, or
humanity.400 They have proclaimed that amidst the cries of
children and the petitions of women homeless from disaster,
they could not stop to argue literal construction of the
Constitution and would instead take the side of mercy and
risk it on that.401
396. See Ryan, supra note 73, at 52223.
397. Paul Slovic et al., Evaluating Chemical Risks: Results of a Survey of
the British Toxicology Society, 16 HUM. & EXPERIMENTAL TOXICOLOGY 289
(1997).
398. Id.; Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risks as Feeling: Some
Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk and Rationality 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311,
31516 (2004) (describing methodologies in Slovic et al., supra note 398).
399. Slovic et al., supra note 399.
400. Landis, supra note 22, at 405.
401. Id. at 406.
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Similar dynamics may have been at play during the
Deepwater Horizon/BP oil spill crisis.402 BP Oil was initially
criticized as failing to express concern and empathy to accident
victims,403 while President Obama emphasized the human
dimensions of the disaster by stating that the catastrophe and
response were
not just a matter of dollars and cents . . . . [Rather,] the standard Im
going to be applying is whether or not those individuals I met with
[in the Gulf], their family members, those communities that are
vulnerable . . . are uppermost in the minds of all concerned. Thats
who were doing this work for.404
As part of this concern, Obama relied on extra-legal values and
judgment, went beyond the legal cap for liabilities, and sought
additional funds of over $20 billion to compensate victims.405
Rather than remain a peripheral issue, empathy and prosocial
concern were essential features of the disaster compensation
efforts.406
Conversely, authorities can use numeric assessments to
deceive or manipulate public reactions to disaster, and
numbers may be skewed to arbitrarily alter judgments and
motivation to help others.407 In one study, investigators
manipulated the proportion of people saved while holding the
402. Jonathan Weisman & Guy Chazan, BP Agrees to $20 Billion Fund,
WALL ST. J., June 17, 2010, at A1. Of course, it is entirely possible that
politics, rather than empathy, motivated President Obamas decision.
Nonetheless, such statement was not the first time President Obama had
invoked empathy as a guide of policy-making. In a commencement address at
Xavier University, President Obama exhorted students to empathize with the
family who lost the entire life they built together when the storm came to
town . . . . [When you] empathize with the plight of others, whether they are
close friends or distant strangersit becomes harder not to act, harder not to
help. Bloom, supra note 203.
403. See Daniel De Wolf & Mohamed Mejri, Crisis Communication
Failures: The BP Case Study, INTL J. ADVANCES MGMT. & ECON., Mar.Apr.
2013, at 48, 52.
404. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President After Meeting
with BP Executives (June 16, 2010),
[https://web.archive.org/web/20100617004624/http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/statement-president-after-meeting-with-bp-executives].
405. See JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR & CURRY L. HAGERTY, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42942, DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL: RECENT ACTIVITIES AND
ONGOING DEVELOPMENTS 1 (2014).
406. Whether $20 billion was the correct amount for compensation is
another matter, and irrelevant to the fact that empathy played an important,
favorable role.
407. See Featherstonhaugh et al., supra note 354, at 283.
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actual number in need constant.408 As a result, individuals
preferred a humanitarian policy in which 4,500 out of 11,000
lives were saved to one in which 4,500 out of 250,000 were,
suggesting that something as irrelevant as changing the
denominator can significantly sway desires to help.409 Numeric
or statistical measurements are thus not just a potential means
of clarifying harm and risk, but also of distorting or
systematically concealing human suffering. In extreme cases,
elite decision-makers may exploit systematization in order to
conceal their own agendas or create the conditions of disaster
themselves.410
In less drastic but still prominent examples, decision-
makers retain significant power concerning public necessity.
For instance, authorities often have at their disposal the
discretion of demolishing, reducing, or using real or personal
property if they deem it necessary to avert an imminent public
disaster.411 In the United States, often as elsewhere,
individuals who lose their property as a result of state
responses to disaster generally must bear the attendant
financial loss,412 as the recent Federal Court of Claims decision
TrinCo Investment Co. v. United States reaffirmed.413 In this
408. Id. at 285.
409. Id. at 28386, 29799.
410. Particularly egregious examples include modern famines in which
30,000,000 Chinese died as a result of Maoist policies, and 2,000,000
Ukrainians died from Soviet efforts to eliminate peasant resistance to
collectivization. Although systematization does not cause such results,
ominous parallels exist between the formalistic and substantive types of
systematization discussed above and the various techniques and procedures
employed in these cases. See JASPER BECKER, HUNGRY GHOSTS: CHINAS
SECRET FAMINE 26674 (1996). See generally JEAN DRÈZE & AMARTYA SEN,
HUNGER AND PUBLIC ACTION (1989).
411. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (noting
a privilege to enter land and take actions that are necessary for the purpose
of averting an imminent public disaster). A public disaster includes events
such as a conflagration, flood, earthquake, or pestilence. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also John Alan
Cohan, Private and Public Necessity and the Violation of Property Rights, 83
N.D. L. REV. 651, 69094, 71828 (2007) (discussing the relationship between
public necessity, takings, and compensation in cases of necessary private
property destruction in situations of fires, floods, infectious diseases, and sick
animals).
412. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
413. TrinCo Inv. Co. v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 98, 9899 (2012)
(dismissing TrinCos complaint for failure to state a claim, finding that the
government is not liable for damages under a takings theory when the
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case, the U.S. Forest Service had initiated a number of fires
adjacent to properties, the resulting damage of which was
considered outside the Takings Clause and solely the plaintiffs
responsibility.414 Other victims of government-induced disaster
have similarly suffered when their homes or farmland were
devastated by flooding.415 Currently, many states refuse to
provide compensation for property taken or destroyed in cases
such as firebreak, release of waters, or breach of
impoundments.416
Authorities may also use disaster and systematic
calculations of necessity to upgrade particular regions. In
China, Ethiopia, and Vietnam, for instance, government
officials have evicted residents and demolished dwellings under
the guise of disaster prevention and mitigation, without
consultation or adequate compensation and relocation for
residents.417 In fact, these efforts were partly directed towards
serving alternative economic and social purposes. The Sri
Lankan Parliament passed an act imposing an extensive
coastal no-construction zone around hundreds of kilometers of
the island.418 The affected people faced resettlement, as well as
loss of assets, cultural roots, and economic livelihood, while
exceptions were made for expensive hotel projects.419
Amidst these conditions, it is problematic to assume that
quantified approaches or the various formalistic, substantive,
and theoretical tools of systematization alone will necessarily
forestall abuse, ensure equal treatment, and motivate
authorities to treat human tragedy with the highest priority.
government destroys property as part of necessary actions to prevent a fire),
revd, 722 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (finding that TrinCos complaint
was sufficiently plead to survive dismissal at the pleading stage, but
preserving governments right to demonstrate its necessity defense to liability
on remand).
414. Id. at 10102.
415. See Big Oak Farms, Inc. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 48, 56 (2012).
416. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-75-124(f) (2003 & Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT.
§252.43(6) (2009); LA. STAT. ANN. § 29;730(H) (2007).
417. See INTL FEDN OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES , LAW AND
REGULATION FOR THE REDUCTION OF RISK FROM NATURAL DISASTERS IN
PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA: A NATIONAL LAW DESK SURVEY 8889 (2012);
INTL FEDN OF RED CROSS & RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES, LAW AND
REGULATION FOR THE REDUCTION OF RISK FROM NATURAL DISASTERS IN VIET
NAM: A NATIONAL LAW DESK SURVEY 74 (2012).
418. See ASIAN DEV. BANK, CURBING CORRUPTION IN TSUNAMI RELIEF
OPERATIONS 9395 (2005).
419. See id.
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The guarantee of optimal disaster outcomes by burdening legal
procedure with regulating all possible acts of deceit, stratagem,
or wrong committed by an authority during or in response to
disaster is implausible. Moreover, rule of law often suffers
during disaster crises, making extra-legal, empathic, and
prosocial responses all the more important.
Robust empathic and prosocial sentiment and judgments
by authorities will also play a particularly vital role for poor,
minority, handicapped, and elderly populations in catastrophic
situations.420 Indeed, much of the destruction during Katrina
affected particularly marginalized or vulnerable groups.421
Nearly half of all persons age sixty-five or older living in
flooded areas during Katrina reported having a disability.422
Moreover, those impacted tended to be disproportionately
poor.423 Pregnant women also have special needs and face
increased risks during disasters, including premature
deliveries, underweight infants, and infant mortality.424 The
elderly are also more susceptible in disaster to poor nutrition,
extreme temperatures, exposure to infection, and emotional
distress than younger populations.425 Ensuring that the most
vulnerable are fully taken into account in planning and
developing plans that incorporate intricate, local factors are
prominent examples of empathic and prosocial decision-
making. Integrating empathy and prosocial considerations is
thus best contemplated as partner, rather than foe, of improved
planning and regulation.
D. EMPATHY AND FRAMES OF DISASTER
Finally, beyond the practical considerations of political
will, volunteers, donations, and experts and authorities, the
420. See Emanuele Castano, Antisocial Behavior in Individuals and
Groups: An Empathy-Focused Approach, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 419, 43132 (Kay Deaux & Mark
Snyder eds., 2012).
421. See THOMAS GABE ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33141,
HURRICANE KATRINA: SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPACTED
AREAS 14, 1617 (2005).
422. Id. at 17.
423. See id. at 1617.
424. See Rama Lakshmi, Group Urges Disaster Planning for Pregnant
Women, Babies, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2006, at A9.
425. See Nancy Aldrich & William F. Benson, Disaster Preparedness and
the Chronic Disease Needs of Vulnerable Older Adults, PREVENTING CHRONIC
DISEASE, Jan. 2008 (A27), at 1, 2.
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actual means by which disaster is framed may also impact
disaster management outcomes. There is lingering
disagreement among disaster scholars about how to define
disaster,426 and yet each group or individual creates a
definition with different ends in mind.427 Since many people
and groups both define and need definitions of disaster, the
criteria selected are consequential.428 Indeed, todays debates
are the result of significant changes in disaster research over
the past fifty years, as theorists and practitioners have
broadened the focus of disaster research from classical
analysis of physical agents429 to social construction, structural
vulnerability, and subjective dimensions.430 Today, some
theorists view disasters as parts of a social structure of human
choice and historical process that reveal social inequality.431
Other commentators favor more objective definitions of
disaster.432 Furthermore, some experts and many state, federal,
and foreign authorities employ characterizations focusing
primarily on physical events.433
This variability raises a question as to whether distinct
characterizations may differentially affect empathic responses
and prosocial motivation in ways relevant to the preceding
analysis. Shifts in focus from the physical character of disaster
to socially constructed dimensions may be relevant.
Conceptualizing hurricanes or earthquakes primarily as
physical events tends to emphasize the traumatic, unforeseen
character of natures forces.434 Conversely, social approaches to
disaster focus on the social system itself, and how ongoing
426. See Chen, supra note 8, at 35; Chen, supra note 14, at 112124.
427. Ronald W. Perry, Definitions and the Development of a Theoretical
Superstructure for Disaster Research, in WHAT IS A DISASTER? PERSPECTIVES
ON THE QUESTION, supra note 63, at 197, 214.
428. Id.
429. See Quarantelli, supra note 63, at 3.
430. See Wolf R. Dombrowsky, Again and Again: Is a Disaster What We
Call Disaster? Some Conceptual Notes on Conceptualizing the Object of
Disaster Sociology, 13 INTL J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 241, 241
(1995).
431. See Tom Horlick-Jones, Modern Disasters as Outrage and Betrayal, 13
INTL J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 305, 305 (1995).
432. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 14; Karatani & Hayashi, supra note 23.
433. See DYNES & QUARANTELLI, supra note 24.
434. See Gary A. Kreps, Disasters as Systemic Event and Social Catalyst,
in WHAT IS A DISASTER? PERSPECTIVES ON THE QUESTION, supra note 63, at
31, 33.
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structural and societal norms, buildings, and organizations
directly or indirectly create disasters and related
vulnerabilities.435 The latter often dismisses classic physical
descriptions of disaster as ignoring the genuine systemic
inequalities or vulnerabilities that calamity exposes rather
than causes.436
At first glance, a more socially constructed approach seems
more likely to foster empathy and prosocial decision-making.
As mentioned earlier, the intensity of experienced emotion,
perceptions of the situation and victim, and characteristics of
the empathizer all substantially determine whether observers
feel empathy or not.437 Social construction appears to capture
the human element better than just focusing on the physical
event itself.438 However, a deeper examination suggests that
social constructivist interpretations could inadvertently
undermine empathy and altruism. A core feature of the social
construction approach is to focus less on the shocking,
unforeseen natural calamity brought about by a physical event
such as a tsunami. Instead, it focuses on the underlying
structural vulnerabilities that exist. Inasmuch as this approach
portrays a disaster as merely a common occurrence that reveals
ongoing inequality and disparity,439 empathy may seem
inappropriate or even foolish.440
Legislative experience appears to corroborate this
judgment concerning the frames of disaster. As 18th and 19th
century U.S. legislators entertained appeals for disaster relief,
mere need, even if desperate, was never enough to ensure a
435. See Quarantelli, supra note 13, at 339.
436. See Carlo Pelanda, Disaster and Sociosystemic Vulnerability, in
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF EARTHQUAKES 67, 69 (Barclay G. Jones &
Miha Tomazevic eds., 1982).
437. See Dickert & Slovic, supra note 297; Figley, supra note 312, at 67;
B. Hudnall Stamm, Introduction to SECONDARY TRAUMATIC STRESS: SELF-
CARE ISSUES FOR CLINICIANS, RESEARCHERS, AND EDUCATORS, supra note
312, at xiii, xiv; Villemure & Bushnell, supra note 304.
438. See Anthony Oliver-Smith, What Is a Disaster?: Anthropological
Perspectives on a Persistent Question, in THE ANGRY EARTH: DISASTERS IN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 18, 2223 (Anthony Oliver-Smith & Susanna
M. Hoffman eds., 1999).
439. See Benigno E. Aguirre, Can Sustainable Development Sustain Us?,
20 INTL J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS 111, 114 (2002).
440. See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK
TECHNOLOGIES 30608 (1999); SCOTT D. SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY:
ORGANIZATIONS, ACCIDENTS, AND NUCLEARWEAPONS 23335 (1993).
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government response.441 Rather, successful appeals nearly
always told of events as sudden, unforeseeable losses for which
the claimant was morally blameless.442 Indeed, the traumatic,
shocking character of disaster as an act of God may have
protected congressional disaster relief where appeals based on
routine, normalized dependency may have otherwise
floundered.443
Contemporary empirical research confirms that the more
people see a tragedy as a normal, foreseeable event resulting
from societal neglect, the less strength an appeal to empathy is
likely to have.444 A physical approach focuses on characteristics
that make features of unforeseeability, shock, and
senselessness more salient,445 thereby encouraging empathy in
non-victim witnesses to a disaster.446 Additional studies
suggest that donations are more miserly when the causes of
disaster are perceived as human rather than natural in
origin.447 As such, greater focus on organizational, socio-
economic, and regularly occurring conditions is likely to
subvert empathy necessary for prosocial helping. Certainly
disasters could be alternatively framed so as to elicit anger and
blameperhaps more consistent with the social constructionist
approachbut this tack does not come without potential risks.
Blaming can easily shift away from authorities and society to
those adversely affected by disaster, which research suggests
can strongly diminish donations and willingness to help.448
On balance, then, if definitions and responses are
standardized, research suggests that an approach emphasizing
the physical, unforeseen, or shocking aspects of disaster would
likely elicit greater empathy in citizens and decision-makers
than those that do not. Said approach would allow greater room
441. Landis Dauber, supra note 22, at 395.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. See Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 397, 41920 (Thomas Gilovich et
al. eds., 2002).
445. See Gary A. Kreps, Disaster as Systemic Event and Social Catalyst: A
Clarification of Subject Matter, 13 INTL J. MASS EMERGENCIES & DISASTERS
255, 25657 (1995).
446. See JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR 23437 (1990).
447. Hanna Zagefka et al., Donating to Disaster Victims: Responses to
Natural and Humanly Caused Events, 41 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 353 (2011).
448. Tehila Kogut, Someone to Blame: When Identifying a Victim Decreases
Helping, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 748 (2011).
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for concrete, visceral representations of harm and risk instead
of colder, dehumanizing ones. At the same time, social
construction elements that emphasize human suffering and
displacement could be salutary as well. In any event, the
frames of disaster we collectively employ, not just
systematization generally, will have relevance to discussions of
reform.
VI. CONCLUSION
Incorporating considerations of the human, empathic, and
prosocial elements of disaster into potential reforms at every
level of disaster risk management is essential. Our collective
response to disaster will no doubt benefit from further
planning, statistical models, and legal regulation. However,
mechanically employing the additional substantive, theoretical,
and formalistic methods outlined above may jeopardize
outcomes if not properly scrutinized. In particular, placing
inordinate focus on formulas, blueprints, and statistics while
disregarding the human dimensions of disaster would be ill-
considered. More fully integrating the growing psychological
and neuroscientific research on empathy and altruism into
disaster decision-making and scholarship may be particularly
useful in this regard. Indeed, as scholars and policy-makers
seek to produce and impose a more systematized structure on
disasters, keeping the human dimensions of disaster at the fore
will ultimately generate more humane, and thus superior,
results.
